COMMENTS
INSIDER LIABILITY UNDER SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT RULE lob-5: THE CADY, ROBERTS DOCTRINE
Ever since the development of the large, publicly-traded corporation, the
prevention of fraud in securities trading has been a major preoccupation of
American courts and legislatures., The halting efforts of common-law courts
to raise standards of fair dealing by corporate insiders from the slough into
which they had fallen in the early years of this century2 were greatly expanded
by the wave of reform legislation following the stock market crash of 1929.
However, the elaborate and far-ranging scheme of regulation that has developed under the securities legislation of the thirties should not obscure the
common-law background of many of the statutory reforms. This is particularly true of those reforms relating to misrepresentation and nondisclosure by
corporate insiders trading in securities of their companies. In this area the
courts have led the way and have laid the groundwork for later statutes and
3
administrative decisions which on their face seem drastic.

1 Loss, SEcURITIEs REGULATION (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss] is the controlling
work in this field. See Ferber, Conflicts of Interest in ReorganizationProceedingsUnder the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 319 (1959); Kaplan, Conflict of Interests: CorporateDirectors, 50 ILL.
BAR J. 1072 (1962); Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close
Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAv & CONTEMP. PROB. 505 (1953); North,
ImpliedLiability Cases Under the FederalSecuritiesLaws, Corporate Practice Commentator,
May 1962, p. 1; Windels, Our Securities Market-Some S.E.C. Problems and Techniques,
8 N.Y.L.F. 169 (1962); Comment, FiduciaryDuties: Application of S.E.C. Rule X-OB-S,
39 CALms. L. REv. 429 (1951); Comment, The Prospects of Rule X-OB-5: An Emerging
Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
2 It has been observed that at early common law corporate managements were trustees
for shareholders who were cestuis according to their property interest. BERLE, STUDIES iN
THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 186 (1928) [hereinafter cited as BERLE]. Cf. Gray v.

Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364 (1807). The later common-law revival of this view rested on
other, more dubious, authority. See the leading case of Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45
S.E. 232 (1903), citing Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 616 (1874) (mortgage purchasing prejudicing bondholders) and 2 POMROy, EQurrY JURiSPRUD)ENCE § 1090 (2d ed.
1901) (cases based on corporate waste and ultra vires acts).
3 CompareOliver v. Oliver, supra note 2, with Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b),
48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1958). CompareIn re Paramount Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp.
823 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) and In re Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), with
Bankruptcy Act § 249, 52 Stat. 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1958), and Public Utility Holding Company Act, Rule 62, 17 C.F.R. § 250.62 (1949). "As judges we are entitled to a
sense of gratification that the Common Law has been able to make so substantial a contribution to the development of the administrative law of this field." SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 98 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
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The recent case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 4 appears to presage a dramatic expansion of the scope of the anti-fraud provisions of Exchange Act
rule lOb-5.5 The decision, described by the Chairman of the Commission as
"a case of first impression and one of signal importance in our administration
of the federal securities acts," involved the activities of a broker, Gintel, who
sold out his discretionary accounts after receiving non-public dividend information given him in good faith by a director of the corporation who was also
a member of the same brokerage firm. The Commission accepted an offer of
settlement by the brokerage firm and suspended the offending broker from
trading for a period of twenty days.6
The decision is important for several reasons. The Commission clearly established that nondisclosure was an "act, practice or course of business" operating "as a fraud or deceit" within the meaning of clause 3 of rule lOb-5. It
held that the rule could reach nondisclosures by persons who are not "insiders" at common law or by the terms of other sections of the Exchange Act,
and that a duty of disclosure was owed even in sales to unidentified persons on
a public exchange. The Commission also refused to consider a broker's fiduciary responsibility to his discretionary accounts as a defense to lOb-5 prosecution. Finally, it disclosed for the first time an awareness of the importance of
the development of implied civil liability, observing that "despite the decline
in importance of a 'federal rule' in the light of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, the
securities acts may be said to have generated a wholly new and far-reaching
body of federal corporation law."
The implications of the decision are far reaching. In view of the wide range
of transactions to which the Exchange Act is applicable, any expansion of
traditional concepts of insider liability is of great importance to American
corporation law. This comment will appraise the legal basis for such expansion
and the possible limitations that may or should be placed upon it.
4 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8, 1961. The case has been widely
noted. See S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CoNTRoLLNG SHArEHoLDEas AND iN UNDERWRrnNGS 131-56
(Israels ed. 1962); Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939

(1962); Kaplan, supra note 1; Comment, 62 COLuM. L. REv. 735 (1962); Comment, 71
YALE L.J. 736 (1962); Note, 75 -HRv. L. REv. 1449 (1962); Note, 60 Mic. L. REv. 651
(1962); Note, 36 ST. JoHN's L.Rnv. 378 (1962); Note, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 731 (1962); Note,
16 U. MIm L. Rav. 474 (1962); Note, 48 VA. L. REv. 398 (1962). See also note 156 infra.
5 The rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949), provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
6 Thus, it should be noted, the case is not subject to appeal. One commissioner would have
refused the offer of settlement and imposed a more severe sanction. Both Cady, Roberts and
Gintel had been disciplined by the New York Stock Exchange after the transaction took
place in 1959.
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1. Facts subject to disclosure.-At common law, insiders theoretically were
held liable only for positive misrepresentations of fact, although relief was
sometimes granted where there was a great disparity of knowledge or intelligence between an insider and an exploited shareholder. 7 An aggrieved shareholder relying on misrepresentation by an insider might have an action for
rescission or for deceit. The rescission remedy required the prompt tendering
back of the security purchased and hence was of limited usefulness. An action
for deceit would lie only when a causal connection between the misrepresentation and loss could be shown and requirements of proof were hence severe. 8
The unsatisfactory state of the early common-law remedies led a number of
courts to grant relief for mere nondisclosure in cases where a glaring inequity
presented itself, thus creating "majority,"9 "minority," and "special circumstances" rules relating to such liability. The "special circumstances" leading
courts to grant relief for nondisclosure were numerous and varied, prompting
some to observe that a "majority rule" state was a state in which no case involving glaring inequities had as yet arisen, whereas states adhering to a strict
fiduciary view did so only because the facts of the first case there arising demanded special relief.10 While this view understates the importance of the theory of liability applied by the courts,"1 it does have some validity because of
the gradual movement of the courts toward stricter standards of liability.12
The so-called "special-facts" courts have been willing to grant relief in cases
where a director sought out a shareholder to buy stock, where a director and
stockholders were the only shareholders, where the director was a majority
shareholder, where the corporation was inactive, where there was an agency
7 See PROSSER, TORTS 532-36 (2d ed. 1955); Tyler v. Savage, 143 U.S. 79, 98 (1892);

Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383 (1888).
8
Reliance was required even under a strict fiduciary view. Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 12 Ariz.
381, 100 Pac. 1094 (1909). An action for rescission for misrepresentation was subject to the
usual contract defenses, including waiver, and, most important, lack of privity. 3 WmLISrON,
SALES §§ 636a, 636b (rev. ed. 1948). A deceit action required proof of scienter, though literal

privity was not required under the rule of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931). See also Cheney v. Dickinson, 172 Fed. 109 (7th Cir. 1909). These cases suggest that an action for deceit could conceivably lie in connection with an exchange transaction where a duty was owed to a particular class of purchasers, e.g., where a prospectus contains misrepresentations. See notes 142, 144, 152 infra.

9 Board of Comm'rs of Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); Connolly v.
Shannon, 105 N.J. Eq. 155, 147 At. 234 (Ch. 1929); Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868), are leading cases reflecting the majority view. See also Percival v.
Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421.
10 Note, 14 MIN. L. Rnv. 530 (1930).
11See Connolly v. Shannon, 105 N.J. Eq. 155, 147 Atl. 234 (Ch. 1929) (majority rule
applied despite special circumstances); Benedict v. Rue, 260 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1958) (minority rule applied where no special circumstances).
12
See, e.g., Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945) (special
circumstances rule adopted) overruling Ryder v. Bamburger, 172 Cal. 791, 158 Pac. 753
(1916; Note, 19 So. CAL. L. Rav. 32 (1945). See also Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 INl. App. 153,
63 N.E.2d 630 (1945).
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or joint venture relationship between a director and shareholders, 13 and where
there was an anticipated merger, consolidation, or dissolution.14 Cases involving an expected sale of corporate assets are less clear,15 some "special-facts"
courts taking great pains to distinguish "between a situation where, at the
time of the stock purchase, there is an assured sale at a price that enhances the
16
value of the stock and a situation where only the possibility of sale exists."'
There is also a division of authority as to whether disclosure of the identity of
an insider purchasing through a straw man is required.17
The "special-facts" cases are in some respects analogous to common-law
cases imposing a duty on sellers of chattels to disclose defects where the parties
are unequally situated.' 8 Where this inequality creates a misapprehension
that goes to the heart of the nature of the thing traded for, relief is granted
at common law. The duty of disclosure is not a fiduciary one since the common-law rule "seems to be that a concealment or misrepresentation as to
extrinsic facts which affect the market price of the thing sold is not fraudulent
while the same concealment of defects in the articles themselves would be
fraudulent."19 The "special-facts" courts apparently take the view that concealment of information about a major structural change in a corporation
goes to a defect in the security itself.2 0 While failure to disclose inside dividend
information has not as yet been held to constitute a "special fact" by any
1314 MINN. L. REV. 530, 533 (1930).
14Bucldey v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N.W. 955 (1925).
1s Compare Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (liability where preliminary sale negotiations), with Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N.E. 445 (1905) (no liability).
16James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 264 F.2d
445, 451 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959).
17 Disclosure of identity was required in Broffe v. Horton, 172 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1949)
(common law); SEC v. Bennett & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,172 (D.N.J. Aug. 13,
1962) (rule lOb-5); Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945); Barnes v.
F. &W. Lumber Co., 205 Ore. 553, 581-88,287 P.2d 929, 942-45 (1955); Fisherv. Budlong,
10 R.I. 525 (1893); Gadsdenv.Bennetto,23 Man. 33,36,9 D.L.R. 719, 720-21 (1913); Allen
v. Hyatt, 3 Ont. Weekly N. 1401, 8 D.L.R. 79 (1912), aff'd, 17 D.L.R. 7 (1914) (common
law). See also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); George v. Ford, 36 App. D.C. 315
(1911). Cf. Nichol v. Sensenbrenner, 220 Wis. 165, 263 N.W. 650 (1936) (reorganization
trustee liable). But compare Fischer v. Guaranty Trust Co., 259 App. Div. 176, 18 N.Y.S.2d
328 (1940), aff'd 285 N.Y. 679, 34 N.E.2d 379 (1941); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49,
54 (N.D. Ohio 1959). See also Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868).
See Conant, Duties of Disclosure of CorporateInsiders Who PurchaseShares, 46 CORNELL
L.Q. 53, 57-58 (1961): "The policy of brokers of listed and over-the-counter securities to
guard the secrecy of their customer lists would probably result in prospective sellers' brokers
refusing to reveal sellers' names. A rule requiring disclosures would effectively bar stock
purchases by officers and directors except from their corporations." It would seem, however,
more reasonable to suppose that brokerage houses would partially revise their disclosure
policies rather than forego insider business altogether.
Is E.g., Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 138 U.S.3 83 (1888); Grigsby v. Stapleton, 94 Mo. 423, 7 S.W. 421 (1888).
19 Grigsby v. Stapleton, supra note 18; PRossER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 722.
20
There is support for this view at common law. See Tyler v. Savage, 143 U.S. 79 (1892).
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state court adhering to the rule, it too would seem to be a defect going to the
heart of an investment security.
It should be noted that, aside from the chattel-sale and "special-facts"
cases, a minority of state courts have taken the position that inside information is an asset held by directors in quasi-trusteeship for individual shareholders.21 Some commentators have gone so far as to consider the relationship a
strict trusteeship. 22 Contrary to the dire forecasts of some writers,23 a fiduciary
view has not required the disclosure of mere opinions as to the prospects of a
corporation. 24 There are, in fact, suggestions in the minority-state opinions
that an insider may be under a fiduciary duty not to disclose private opinions
where these will be given unduly authoritative weight by his cestui, 25 though
no such rule obtains in "special-facts" jurisdictions.
21 Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77
Pac. 277 (1904); Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916); Gadsden v.
Bennetto, 23 Man. 33,9 D.L.R. 719 (1913); 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS
§ 1168.2, n. 76.
22

BERLE 180.

23 E.g., Walker, Duty of Disclosure of a Director PurchasingStock From His Shareholders, 32 YALE L.J. 637 (1923).
24 Hacker v. Kyle, 211 Wis. 584, 248 N.W. 134 (1933).
2s Sluss v. Brown-Crumner Inv. Co., 143 Kan. 14, 18, 53 P.2d 900, 903 (1936). See also
Tone v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 286 Ill.
App. 169, 3 N.E.2d 142 (1936). Cf. SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 6721 (Feb. 2, 1962), at p. 3 n. 10 (broker-dealer recommending
security to client must disclose lack of essential information about issuer); Alexander Reid
& Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727 (Feb. 8,1962); Mac Robbins & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846 (July 11, 1962) (on appeal) (extending Reid
rule to salesmen held not entitled to rely on representations by employer); B. Fennekohl &
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6898 (Sept. 18, 1962); A. J. Caradean &
Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6903 (Oct. 1, 1962). Cf. Stone v. United
States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940); United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 629 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962); SEC v. Rapp, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91, 162 (2d
Cir. July 21, 1962); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943); SEC v.
Okin, 137 F.2d 862, 864 (2d Cir. 1943); UltramaresCorp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179,
174 N.E. 441,444 (1931): "The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to
make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract to make it with the
care and caution proper to their calling. Fraud includes the pretense of knowledge where
knowledge there is none." See also Knickerbocker Merchandising Co. v. United States,
13 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1926) (L. Hand, J.). But see Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1961).
The British law relating to "puffing" of securities has hitherto been somewhat ahead of
the American. Section 12 of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo.
6, c. 16 penalizes "the reckless making of any statement, promise or forecast which is misleading, false, or deceptive." (Emphasis supplied.) The provision was carried over to the
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45. The English courts have
had difficulty with this language. Compare R. v. Bates, [1952] 2 All E.R. 842 (C.A.) (statute
covers "the case where there is a high degree of negligence without dishonesty"), with R. v.
Mackinnon, [1959] 1 Q.B. 150 (statute requires dishonesty, but "often ...the only evidence
of dishonesty consists of evidence that no grounds exist on which any reasonable man could
have believed in the truth of the statement... juries are not slow in a proper case to draw
the inference of fraud"). Cf. R. v. Grunwald, [1961] 2 Weekly L.R. 606 (C.A.) (dishonesty
not required, but no liability for "a statement made as a result of an apparently responsible
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The common-law minority rule must be viewed not as an isolated formalism but as an attempt to restore what has been referred to in a different and
more controversial context as "that equality of position between the parties in
which liberty of contract begins." 26 The "special-facts" cases have in effect applied this principle to securities transactions. 27 The justification for the use of
full disclosure principles in securities transactions must depend on the degree
of the inequality of position to be redressed in order to achieve a free bargain
between informed parties. The impersonal nature of modem securities exchanges, which allow the possessor of inside information to deal with not one
but hundreds of buyers, the opportunities for profitable manipulation and the
magnitude of the difference in knowledge between an inside director and an
unsophisticated small investor are factors which justify this application of the
rule.
To be sure, duties of disclosure imposed by contract law have been sharply
criticized, both as applied to chattel sales and in the context of securities trading. "Unequal knowledge," it is said, "is a common characteristic of contract
negotiations in an enterprise economy." 28 According to advocates of this view
person having given one the information.... Of course, if one knows facts outside what
one has been told, that must be taken into consideration."). An earlier version of the statute
which would have penalized a person making "a promise or forecast which he has no
reasonable ground for supposing to be likely to be fulfilled or verified" was revised after
opposition from the financial community. See 132 ECO1iMIST 231 (1938); 133 ECONOMIST
331, 385 (1938); MNHeIM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RICoNSRUCriON 123-29 (1946)
and the parliamentary debates there cited. Cf. Board of Trade, Report on Share Pushing,
CMD. NO. 5539 (1937). On the nonstatutory English law, see Reese River Mining Co. v.
Smith, L.R. 4 H.L. 64, 79-80 (1869); Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 368, 374 (1889);
Smith v. Chadwick, 9 App. Cas. 187, 203 (1884); KENNY, OUTLINES OF CIuMINAL LAW 252
n.2 (13th ed. 1929).
26
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27 (1915) (Holmes, J. dissenting). Cf. the language of
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951): "The duty of disclosure
...is an attempt to provide some degree of equalization of bargaining position in order
that the minority may exercise an informed judgment .... See also B. Fennekohl & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6898, p. 6: "The concept of puffing is derived
from the doctrine of caveat emptor and arises primarily in the sale of tangibles where it
appears that examination by the purchaser may offset exaggerated statements and expressions of opinion by the salesman. It can have little application to the merchandising of securities."
2
7 See the leading "special-facts" case of Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 433 (1909):
"The whole transaction gives conclusive evidence of the overwhelming influence defendant
had in the course of the negotiations as owner of a majority of the stock and as agent for the
other owners, and it is clear that the final consummation was in his hands at all times."
But courts have refrained from applying modem doctrines of implied warranty to securities
issuers. See Shulman, CivilLiabilityand the SecuritiesAct, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 230 n.9 (1933).
See also the limited nature of the warranties provided by UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFm ACT
§ 11; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-306.

28 "The party who has been diligent in reducing some of the market uncertainties to fact
is not required to come forth and offer his information to the less diligent." Conant, supra
note 17, 56-57. For a defense of full disclosure, see Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Nondisclosure, 15 TExAs L. REv. 1 (1936); cf. BowER, ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION 425-27
(1911). Compare BowFR, AcTIoNABLE NONDISCLOSURE 308-09, 382-84 (1915).
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no duty other than the duty to avoid fraud and half-truths should be owed to
the other party in a contractual transaction. However, the economic validity
of this view of contractual relationships seems open to question, since ideals
of freedom of trade rather than free competition seem overly dominant.
The advocates of the laissez-faire view recognize the impropriety of the use
of inside information by fiduciaries, but regard it as a wrong only to the corporation. Cases like Gadsden v. Bennetto29 may be cited for the view that inside
information is a sort of trust fund held by the directors for the benefit of their
corporate cestui. However, this view seems no more satisfactory and no less
fictitious than a rule that would charge directors as trustees for individual
shareholders.30
Since the directors to be charged for the corporate benefit are in control of
the corporation, an action by the corporation itself is unlikely. Adherents of
the strict fiduciary approach thus urge a derivative action by corporate shareholders similar to the proceedings under section 16(b).31 However, 16(b) actions rest on a strong statutory mandate providing for the allowance of adequate attorneys' fees.32 This incentive to bring suit, an incentive which itself
raises questions of legal ethics, 33 would presumably not be present in any
common-law action that might be afforded, and single shareholders would be
unlikely to sue simply to recover a diluted interest in the proceeds of a director's transaction. Furthermore, a derivative cause of action against a director
could, under this view, be vitiated upon ratification of the transaction by the
board of directors, and the ratification thus consummated could not be questioned on the basis that the acts ratified were fraudulent. 34 Moreover, the strict
rule would view purchases by a corporation itself as purely contractual, and
would thus require "state and federal statutes aimed at specific wrongs" to
29 23 Man. 33, 9 D.L.R. 719 (1913).
30 And its application gives rise to difficulties and anomalies, as even its proponents recognize. See Conant, supra note 17, at 75.
31Conant, supra note 17, at 67, citing Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the SecuritiesExchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 385, 408 (1953), says that § 16(b) "appears to pro-

ceed on the principle that the confidential information which a corporate insider automatically obtains by virtue of his position belongs to the corporation." But the section was
designed primarily for the protection of investors. See 2 Loss 1041. Where corporate opportunity is not a factor, "it is difficult to detail any certain injury to a corporation from the fact
of active trading in its shares other than that in some way the liquidity and veracity of the
market for its shares might have been impaired." Loss also suggests that at times it may be
that in preparing the market for his activities the insider has acted in a manner directly
detrimental to the interests of the corporation. Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors,

Officers, and Shareholders, 38 MicH. L. REv. 133, 150 (1939).
32

Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).

33 See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
34
Conant, supra note 17, at 75, says "one can only conclude that the courts have erred
in denying corporate recovery of profits made by officers and directors by speculating in the
stock of their corporation without consent of the board of directors." (Emphasis added.)
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In addition, a view charging a director as trustee for

his corporation would give rise to double liability where purchasers or sellers
36
were also accorded a remedy for affirmative misrepresentations.
The relationship of rule 10b-5 to common-law standards presents two
problems of interpretation, both of which were explicitly or implicitly dealt
with by the SEC in Cady, Roberts. First, a question exists as to whether rule

lOb-5 constitutes anything more than a "special-facts" rule, since all the cases
that have thus far reached the courts have involved special circumstances of
one kind or another.3 7 In the case of Speed v. Transamerica,a district court
observed, by way of dictum, that
[T]he plan.., to capture the Axton-Fisher inventory by merging, dissolving, or liquidating Axton-Fisher is the crucialfinding in this case.... The
non-disclosures of the increased earnings and increased value of the tobacco
inventory ... have significance because there was such a plan....
... We have, here, sufficient such reasons in the non-disclosure... to
support violation of the SEC rule where there has been an express finding
38
of the existence of such a plan.

Supporters of the "special-facts" view can thus validly maintain that this
case turned on the question of whether nondisclosure would have influenced
the seller's judgment, since failure to disclose the inventory market value would,
39
according to the court, have been harmless without the liquidation plan.
However, the leading case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., where the
court held that a trust relationship was established by the rule and that the
action was thus not analogous to an action for common-law deceit,40 supports
35 Id. at 65. Accord, Anchor Realty & Inv. Co. v. Rafferty, 308 Ill. App. 484, 32 N.E.2d
394 (1941), 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs 81 (1951). Compare Northern Trust Co. v.
Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 Ill. App. 134, 108 N.E.2d 493 (1952). See also note 61 infra.
36 This result has been defended by analogy to arguments relating to double liability
under § 16(b) and rule l0b-5. Conant, supra note 17, at 68, citing Comment, 59 YALE L.J.
1120, 1140-42 (1950). However it is one thing to allow double liability as a matter of
statutory construction of § 16(b), and quite another to advocate the creation of a new
cause of action in disregard of the double liability problems which it raises. It cannot convincingly be said that a defendant has wronged both his corporation and the person with
whom he deals in an amount equal to twice the insider's profit, or even in an amount equal
to his profit plus the difference between contract price and market value on date of sale.
This is even assuming, contrary to some cases, that this conservative measure of fraud damages to the purchaser or seller was used in a case involving unjust enrichment. See REsTATEmNT, RasTrri

oN, § 151 (1937).

37 Latty, supra note 1, at 505.
38 99 F. Supp. 808, 828, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
39 Latty, supra note 1. But see, SEC v. Greenfield, SEC Litigation Releases 302, 333
(E.D. Pa. 1946), where a failure to disclose a permanent discrepancy between actual and
book value was held a violation of lOb-5 even though there was no impending sale.
40 "If the plaintiffs' cause of action were solely for common law deceit, they would of
course have to prove a loss as part of their case.... There are many decisions to this
effect, and the rule is not questioned. They have no application, however, in a case in which
the action is not for damages for deceit but is for a share of the profits of the transaction."
73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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the view that rule 10b-5 merely adopted the minority common-law doctrine.
In addition, the rule has been applied in a number of cases against brokerage
firms where no special circumstances were present, and SEC cases prior to
Cady, Roberts adhered to this view.41
Another problem created by the rule arises from the fact that few of the
"special-facts" cases at common law involved clear cases of nondisclosure.
Hence, it has been argued that the rule does nothing more than reiterate the
common-law rule forbidding half-truths.42 However, this argument also seems
weak. The dearth of common-law cases involving clear failures to disclose is
attributable to the failure of common-law courts to apply the disclosure rule
to exchange transactions 43 rather than to any requirement that the nondisclosure be coupled with a misrepresentation or half-truth. For in closely held
corporations, where dealings are face-to-face, it becomes impossible to dissociate nondisclosures and misrepresentations. The language of many cases
nonetheless makes clear that nondisclosure is regarded as a separate offense. 44
Courts have viewed these restrictive interpretations of the rule with distinct
lack of sympathy and have repeatedly held that rule lOb-5 goes beyond the
common-law fraud standard of the "special-facts" and "half-truth" cases. 45
Similar holdings have been made with reference to the federal Mail Fraud
Act.46 In construing the rule courts have generally treated subsection 2 as the
41 Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139
F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943); SEC v. Mueller, SEC Litigation Release No. 264, 268 (E.D. Wis.
1945) (consent decree-failure to disclose net earnings and book value per share); SEC v.
Mitchell, SEC Litigation Release No. 288, 291 (N.D. Ohio 1945) (consent decree-failure
to disclose market price of stock).
42 Reply Brief for Cady, Roberts & Co., p. 4. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa
362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916) is a case which on its facts supplies no basis for finding that the
decision rested on misrepresentations, half-truths, other trust relationships, civil law rules,
or the corporate opportunity doctrine. Cf. Conant, supra note 17, at 61 nn.35, 37, 38, citing
similar cases which can, with effort, be made to rest on other grounds.
43 Cf. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933) (no liability for misrepresentation in exchange dealings in majority rule state).
44
See Tyler v. Savage, 143 U.S. 79 (1892) (failure to disclose passing of most recent dividend accompanied by half-truth assertions that "the last dividend declared was a 7% semiannual. The fiscal year ends on the first of June" held ground for recovery. Id. at 81.).
45 See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961): "Section 10(b) speaks in terms
of the use of 'any manipulative device or contrivance'. ... Had Congress intended to limit
... [SEC] authority to regulations prescribing common law fraud, it would probably have
said so. We see no reason to go beyond the plain meaning of the word 'any,' indicating that
the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances of whatever kind may be forbidden, to construe the statute as if it read 'any fraudulent' devices." Id. at 274. SEC v.
Norris & Hirschberg, Inc., 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
46 United States v. Groves, 122 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 670 (1941)
(failure of officer of corporation to disclose his participation as joint adventurer in sale of
stock to corporation). The criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958), proscribes "any scheme
or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises .... " See also Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313
(1896); Deaver v. United States, 155 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 766 (1946);
United States v. Buchner, 108 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 669 (1940); Kaufmann v. United States, 282 Fed. 776 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 735 (1922).
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broadest provision. 47 This seems a curious result, since the subsection makes it
unlawful only "to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the qircumstances in which they were made,
not untruthful." The appearance of the word "fraud" in subsection 3, which
proscribes "any act, practice, or course of business which operates or could
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person," has led some courts to read the
section as merely a codification of the common law,48 and to strain to bring
cases involving "pure' nondisclosures and manipulations by brokers within
subsection 2. While the weight of authority thus holds that section 2 at least
goes beyond the common-law "special-facts" cases, some courts maintain that
it does not,49 except insofar as it adopts the equitable doctrine of constructive
fraud by dispensing with the need for proof of wrongful intent.5 0 This view
seems defensible since, as we have seen, section 2 finds its roots in the common-law half-truth cases. If, as the CharlesHughesMO, case suggests, the Commission is empowered to go beyond the common-law cases in prohibiting
fraud, then section 3 is its logical vehicle, with its broad "act, practice, or
course of business" phraseology, and its prohibition not only of conduct
which "operates" but of conduct which "would operate" as a fraud or deceit.
47 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270,274 (9th Cir. 1961) (false promise to buyer of voice in management); Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (broker's failure to disclose profits
on sale from inventory); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 486 (1943) (broker's failure to disclose excess commission); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (failure to disclose increased inventory valuation
where merger planned); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(failure to disclose contemplated sale of assets where question related to sale of stock). But
see Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (same facts, held
within subsection 3); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (failure to disclose inventory changes and
net losses) (dictum, "at most" within § 3 alone).
48 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, supranote 47, at 447; Hughes v. SEC, supra note 47, at
975. This view is supported in Daum & Phillips, The Implicationsof Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus.
LAW. 939, 943-47 (1962).

49 Connolly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (failure to disclose plan for
sale of assets). "Mhe duty to speak which is implicit in Rule X lOb-5 arises in those circumstances where a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship exists, where confidence is
reposed or influence acquired .... But it cannot be supposed that the rule imposes a duty
to speak in all cases involving the purchase or sale of securities irrespective of the relations
of the parties or the circumstances under which the transaction is consummated." Id. at 59.
See Mills v. Saijem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 766-67 (D.N.J. 1955) (no duty of broker
under rules lOb-5 and 15c(1)(2) to disclose uncertain plan for resale of assets).
50 Connolly v. Balkwill, supra note 49, at 58. The Martin Act in New York has also been
construed to dispense with the common-law requirement of scienter, People v. Federated
Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926) (conviction for concealment of damaging
information in prospectus where warnings of "speculative" nature ofissue were thought sufficient to avoid fraud) (compare N.Y. LAws, ch. 553 (McKinney 1955)), as has the Federal
Mail Fraud Act, Foshay v. United States, 68 F.2d 205, 210 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291
U.S. 674 (1934). Both these acts are criminal statutes where strict requirements of proof
might be expected to apply.
5oa 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
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2. Who must disclose ?-The most significant aspect of the Cady, Roberts
decision is the Commission's application of rule lOb-5 to persons other than
officers, directors, and controlling shareholders. In announcing this extension,
the Commission observed:
We have already noted that the anti-fraud provisions are phrased in
terms of "any person" and that a special obligation has been traditionally
required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, directors, and controlling
shareholders. 51These three groups, however, do not exhaust the classes of
persons upon whom there is such an obligation. Analytically, the obligation
rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second,
the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing....
Mhus our task here is to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer
correlative duties in trading in its securities.
While the SEC can find support for its position in the literal language of the
statute and rule, it has not hitherto stressed the rule's use of the phrase "any
person." 52 The rule has, however, been applied to activities of brokers5 3 and,
in several instances, to fraud perpetrated by outside purchasers of stock.54 But
51There appears to be no common-law minority rule or special-facts case imposing a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders vis-a-vis individual stockholders. Yourd, supranote
31, at 139-43. Rather majority stockholders were considered trustees for the shareholders as
a whole, Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Geller v. Transamerica
Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945); Sautter v.
Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179 N.E. 310 (1932), or, by application of the so-called "instrumentality" doctrine, trustees to the minority shareholders, Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939); Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919). See 3 Loss 1446, n.4.
52 Both § 10(b) of the statute and rule 10b-5 apply to activities of "any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange .... " Section 3(a)(9) of
the statute provides that "when used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires...
the term 'person' means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint
stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated organization." See Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960) ("If an issuing corporation is
not within the regulation, it is not because it is not a 'person.' "). But compare Mills v.
Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1955) ("The cases imposing a duty on the
part of a purchaser of shares of stock to disclose his knowledge of future prospects and plans
all involve situations where the purchaser holds a fiduciary position and where the knowledge has been obtained by virtue of an 'inside' position.").
53 Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 174 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); In the Matter of Van Alstyne,
Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311 (1952); R. D. Bayly & Co., 19 S.E.C. 773 (1945). All of these
cases involved transactions also held violative of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and
§ 15(c)(i) of the 1934 act, and rule 10b-5 was applied without discussion. SEC v. Van Loo,
SEC Litigation Releases Nos. 940, 945 (W.D. Mich. 1955).
54 See the recent important case of Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d
195 (5th Cir. 1960) (2-1 decision), criticized in 13 STAN. L. RaE. 378 (1960) (fraud by out-
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until recently, discussions of the rule have tended to read into it definitions of
55
an insider contained in section 16(b) and other portions of the act.
What justifications are there for a further extension of the rule? It seems
clear that a literal application of the rule would have little merit. It has been
suggested that such an approach to the rule would produce fraud rather than
prevent it by leaving transactions of innocent persons open to attack on mere
suspicion, or as the result of entrapment. 5 6 Thus some limiting principle is
called for and the principle adopted should find some basis in common-law
experience.
Both at common law5 7 and under the Exchange Act,58 a person acting as
5
an insider's agent in the perpetration of a fraud is liable for nondisclosure. 9
Indeed, one court has gone so far as to observe of such agents that "it would
be sufficient if they had merely mailed a letter without knowing its contents or
even had merely supplied their stationery, provided that they knew that in so
doing they were rendering service essential to or participating in a scheme of
sider as to value of consideration paid for securities). See also SEC Litigation Release No.
397 (April 17, 1947) (mail fraud); SEC Litigation Release No. 499 (Feb. 4, 1949) (customer giving false orders to dealers), cited in Comment, 39 CALiF. L. REv. 429, 434 (1951).
55Section 16(b) of the act applies to "every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security... or who is a
director or an officer of the issuer of such security .... A controlling shareholder was held
within the rule in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
56 3 Loss 1451; Comment, 39 CAriF. L. REv. 429, 439 (1951).
57 Emory v. Parrott, 107 Mass. 95 (1871) (outside associate of partner purchasing from
partnership held jointly and severally liable with partner). Zinc Carbonate Corp. v. First
National Bank of Shullsburg, 103 Wis. 125, 131, 79 N.W. 229, 232 (1899) (national bank as
outside associate of corporate officer); Lomita Land & Water Co. v. Robinson, 154 Cal. 36,
46, 97 Pac. 10, 14 (1908) (outside associate of promoter, even though associate was not in
league with promoter from the beginning since "it matters not how unequal may have been
the assistance rendered"). See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (Brandeis, J.) (outside associate ofreceiver); Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N.Y. Supp. 768 (1932) (outside
associate of corporate officers). See also Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 534 (1885) (rescission
of contract with wife of officer granted on theory that officer was agent for his wife in transaction). Cf. In re Calton Crescent, 173 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.) (Swan, J.), aff'd sub nom. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949) (outsiders chargeable with knowledge of
officer, who is their agent where they exercise no independent judgment in investment of
funds) (dictum).
58 Fry v. Shumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (brokers knowingly participating in
fraudulent solicitation scheme liable as co-conspirators or joint tort-feasors at common law
and under rule 10b-5); In the Matter of M. S. Wein & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 3855 (1946) (broker attending meetings of directors prior to fraud); Matter of
General Securities Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3678 (1945) (brokerage
license revoked where broker sold out director wife's account after transferring his holdings
to her.)
59 But compare In re Franklin Building Co., 178 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1949) (2-1 decision),
cert. denied sub nom. Simonsen v. Emmerling, 339 U.S. 978 (1950) (refusal to limit to cost
pursuant to § 212 of Bankruptcy Act claim on bonds purchased by immediate family of
reorganization committeeman at his advice). See also note 99 infra.
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fraud."60 It is likewise clear, both at common law6 1 and under the Securities

Act,62 that a corporation itself may be held liable for nondisclosure in the purchase or sale of shares, or in their conversion.6 3 More difficult problems arise
in connection with transactions involving other persons receiving information:
employees, individuals doing business with a corporation, bankers, attorneys,

wives and relatives, recipients of "hot tips" and those receiving information
from such persons.
Moreover, the broad language of the rule suggests that it might eventually

be applied not only to persons possessing undisclosed information about the
affairs of a corporation, but also to persons possessing undisclosed information about contemplated manipulated trading of a corporation's stock. 64 Section 10(b), it should be noted, is aimed at "manipulative" as well as "deceptive" devices. Failure to reveal manipulations has already been held by the
Commission to be a nondisclosure within the meaning of rule 10b-5,6s while
60 Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
App. 134, 108 N.E.2d 493 (1952);
61 Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres, 348 Ill.
Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 805, 831, 23 N.W.2d 620, 632 (1946) (dictum); 3 Loss
1454. See also the cases where purchase by a corporation benefits its shareholding directors:
App. 5 (1932); Johnson v. Mansfield Hardware Lumber
Wood v. McLean Drug Co., 266 11.
Co., 143 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. La. 1956). ContraGladstone v. Murray Co., 314 Mass. 584, 50
N.E.2d 958 (1943) (director's "duty was to the company for which he was acting and not to
the seller of the stock"). BER. at 187-88, states: "Certain information must be withheld for
the best interests of everyone concerned, the interest in concealment being so great as to
override the individual interests of the persons buying or selling... [even though] there is
something to be said for the proposition laid down by Horace that a man of blameless life
needs no quiver full of arrows for his bow." Percival v. Wright, [190212 Ch. 421,426 (same
view was taken as to disclosures by directors trading for their own account). But see Oliver
v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 368, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (1903) (strict disclosure upheld though corporation prejudiced); 14 MINN. L. REv. 530 (1930).
62 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 820 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Northern Trust Co.
v. Essaness, 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D.Ill. 1952); Ward La France, 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); SEC
v. Oils & Indus., 11 S.E.C. Ann. Rep. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (director's interests enhanced).
63 Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 843-50 (D. Del.), aff'd, 162 F.2d 36 (3d
Cir. 1947); MacGill v. MacGill, 135 Md. 384, 109 At. 72 (1919) (common law); 59 YALE
L.J. 1151 (1950). But see National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Univ., 134 F.2d 689, 694
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 773 (1943) (no disclosure duty where exchange of shares
upon merger).
64 Manipulative practices with reference to securities registered on a national exchange
are dealt with by § 9 of the act, and particularly by § 9(a)(2). But a § 10b-5 liability for exchange transactions would not completely duplicate § 9(a), since § 9(e) of the act imposes a
short limitation period upon § 9(a) private actions and allows a court to require an undertaking for the payments of costs of suit. Section lOb-5 imposes no such restrictions.
65 In the case of Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941), the Commission held that the use of a
practice prohibited as to registered exchange securities by § 9(a)(2) constituted a "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device of contrivance" within the meaning of § 15(c)(1),
and thus extended to all exchange transactions involving brokers. Similar reasoning has been
used to justify the promulgation of rule IOb-i, which extends the 9(a) prohibitions to securities exempt from registration on a national exchange. Cases directly applying lOb-5 include
R. L. Emacio & Co., 35 S.E.C. 191, 199-200 (1953); Adams & Co., 33 S.E.C. 444, 457
(1952) (manipulation of exchange prices in connection with over-the-counter sale); Halsey
Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 112 (1949) (manipulation of over-the-counter prices); Thornton &
Co., 28 S.E.C. 208, 224-25 (1948).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

134

[Vol. 30:121

court cases arising under section 17(a) have taken this view with reference to
over-the-counter sales consummated at a rigged market price. "An offer 'at
the market,'" courts have observed, "must have been understood to imply a
price fixed by supply and demand, free from artificial restriction and intentional stimulation." 66 Thus a sale at a price determined by a manipulated
market was held to be an actionable "half-truth" of the type proscribed in the
common-law chattel cases and under section 2 of 17(a) and rule lOb-5. One
might not need to go far from this view to find that a sale on a manipulated
market, apart from any express agreement as to a market price standard for a
non-market sale, constitutes a fraudulent or deceitful act, practice, or course
of business within the meaning of section 3.67
Rule lOb-5 thus in the long run could supply the answer to one of the
Commission's more pressing present problems, that presented by the fund
manager or investment adviser who uses his advance knowledge of controlled
market movements to earn a profit for his own account. In the recent Capital
Gains case, the Second Circuit, in a five to four en banc decision, declined to
hold that "scalping" by an investment adviser constituted a fraud upon his
client prohibited by sections 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act.
The court reasoned, not illogically, that if advice to the client were sound and
sincere, the adviser's "scalping" activities did not constitute a fraud upon him.68
6

6 Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652, 661-64 (9th Cir. 1947); Collins v. United States,

157 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1946) (conviction for conspiracy to
violate § 17(a) and mail fraud statute in over-counter activities affirmed; acquittal below
as to substantive charge); Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579, 583 (6th Cir. 1939) (manipulation of exchange prices in connection with over-the-counter sale); R. J. Koppe v. SEC, 95
F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1938) (manipulation of exchange prices in connection with over-counter
sale).
67 At common law, a third person induced to buy from manipulators at an unfair price
had an action for deceit, subject, however, to the difficult requirements of privity and reliance. These requirements were rarely met, save where there was a false representation of a
§ 2 nature. See Loss 888; Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co., 2 Q.B. 724, 734 (1892)
(dictum); Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. & N. 538, 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (Ex. 1859) (recovery

allowed market purchaser for misrepresentations as to allocation of shares in obtaining exchange listing), overruled in Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873); Salaman v. Warner,
65 L.T.R. (n.s.) 132 (C.A. 1891). See also Brown v. Werblin, 138 Misc. 29, 244 N.Y. Supp.
209 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (profits of pool not trust fund for injured purchasers in individual representative suit). See Moore & Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2
U. Cm. L. Riv. 46, 70-72 (1934).
68 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., CCII FED. SEC. L. REP. (2d ed.) 91,166
(2d Cir. 1961), affirming 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (construing Investment Advisers

Act, §§ 206(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. 80b-6(1), (2)). The act makes it unlawful "to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client.. ." or "to engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon
any client." The district court concluded that "the words 'fraud' and 'deceit' are used in their
technical sense" and demanded proof that liquidation of the adviser's account reduced the
value of clients' stock. 191 F. Supp. at 898. A court of appeals panel affirmed, distinguishing
Cady, Roberts as a case involving inside information, in a 2-1 decision, one judge concurring
only in the result. 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1962). The court made the provocative observation
that "the artificial stimulant" of a small firm's advice was dwarfed by "the buying power
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It was not, however, called upon to decide whether the adviser's purchases or
sales of stock constituted fraud upon the persons to whom he sold or from
whom he bought. This issue was obliquely touched upon in the dissenting
opinion by Judge Clark, which observed that
it is the recognition that if investment advisers are to "defraud" anyone
it will not be in the normal buyer-seller context which is crucial to this case.
For it is in the secondary effects of advice, not in direct dealings, that the
real potentials for fraud lie in this field. To reach and prevent that is the
purpose of this legislation; defrauding in direct dealings is covered by the
earlier acts regulating brokers and dealers. 69
This proposition, however, is not self-evident even in relation to investment
advisers, let alone persons who directly manage large funds. If rule lOb-5 is
ultimately to be read in terms close to its "any person" language, and thus be
construed as an announcement of standards of fair dealing binding on all
market traders,70 the fact that the undisclosed information relates to market
trading rather than corporate affairs might not preclude liability. In an age of
giant mutual and pension funds, it can scarcely be denied that knowledge of
future purchases and sales can be as valuable as knowledge of undisclosed
corporate developments. But such extensions of the rule wil take place, if
ever, in the distant future, despite the cases we have mentioned. For the Capital Gains case itself suggests judicial resistance to the use of rules prohibiting
fraud and deceit as means of preventing activities that courts have regarded,
rightly or wrongly, as manipulative rather than fraudulent in nature.
which comes from pension funds, investment trusts, university and hospital endowments,
foundations [and] insurance companies." Id. at 748. The en bancopinion relied primarily on
the absence of an express prohibition ofmanipulative practices in the statute as it stood prior
to 1960. But both majority and dissenting judges overlooked the fact, not strongly urged by
the SEC, that what was sought was not an injunction against the adviser's trading itself, but
an injunction against his failing to disclose a potentially adverse interest. Cf.note 17 supra.
69 SECv. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. (2d ed.)
91,166
(2d Cir. 1961). In the District Court, the Commission abandoned an effort to reach the
transaction under the Investment Company Act, but the Exchange Act was not invoked.
Compare Windels, Our Securities Markets-Some S.E.C. Problems and Techniques, 8
N.Y.L.F. 169, 185-86 (1962) ("When one has the power to invest large sums, there is always
a temptation to use that power to give leverage to a private transaction.... There is the
temptation to make a personal investment and then bring in fund money to give the particular stock a ride.... [P]ractices of this sort are a strong indication that the management
tolerating them should not be entrusted with the fiduciary role which is the principal thing
that a fund sells to its investors."). See also One William Street Fund, 2 CCH BLUE SKY L.
REP. 52,623.03 (quoting Wis. Dept. Securities, Monthly Bulletin, May 1958) (mutual fund
required to insert in charter provisions that "(a) the investment adviser may not profit directly or indirectly from sales to or from the portfolio, (b) no member of the Board of
Directors or of the investment or portfolio committees of the fund may serve on the Board
of Directors of a company in which the investment company holds securities."). Cf.Wall
Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1962, p.4, col. 3 (N.Y. Stock Exchange release on "scalping").
70 See text at note 115 infra. But compare Mills v. Sajem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1955) (outside buyer of stock not obliged to disclose merger plan while acquiring
stock). Cf.2 Loss 1392.
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Rule lOb-5 thus remains a rule directed primarily against misrepresentations and nondisclosures, rather than against manipulations. Its future significance will be determined by the extent to which the expansion of possible
insider liability approaches the literal application of the "any person" rule.
It seems clear that the rule will not be literally applied, since the courts appear
unwilling to hold that fraud exists apart from some sort of confidential relationship involving tort-feasor and victim. Cady, Roberts does, however, constitute a clean break with the view as to the limitations of the "any person" rule
expressed by a representative of the SEC in 1952:
Mr. Byrne: They [SEC] agree 100% that an insider cannot take advantage of a stockholder of his company in connection with the purchase
from him or the sale to him of the company's stock where he has information not known to that man on the other side of the transaction because
of his fiduciary obligation to disclose it to him. I do not believe, however,
the Commission takes the second and third steps in their current consideration of X10B5, and by second and third steps I mean this: That insider
could communicate to an outsider the same information he knows, and the
outsider might act on it and unless the Commission had evidence from
which they could conclude that the insider was a party in fact to the transaction, either acted in concern with or conspiracy with the outsider, I do
not think that they would hold the outsider as being in violation of Rule
X10B5; and your third case is what I call the locker-room case.., where
a fellow at the golf club overhears the insider talking to a friend of his and
he himself acts on the basis of the information he heard and that case I do
not think the Commission would touch at all at this stage of its existence.
Mr. Heller: Would they hold the insider?
Mr. Byrne: They would hold the insider without question in the first
case; in the second and third cases they would not hold the outsider who
had the inside information, unless they could show a conspiracy or concert
of action with the insider, in which event they would hold both of them, and
in no event would they hold the locker-room man. 71
In Cady, Roberts, the Commission goes well beyond the view that a "concert or conspiracy" was necessary to hold an outsider. This is clear since the
insider was guilty of no breach of trust, and the Commission's opinion emphasizes that the decision rests on general principles of liability, loosely described in the opinion as "the existence of a relationship" and "inherent unfairness," rather than on the existence of the partnership. The Commission
notes that since a fiduciary relationship prohibited a director from trading,
"by logical sequence, it should prohibit a partner." The logic of this prohibition is found by the Commission in the rule set forth in the Restatement of
Restitution, section 201(2):
71 Peter T. Byrne, Director of the Division of Trading and Exchanges, in Study of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, pp. 725-26 (1952).
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Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the beneficiary communicates
confidential information to a third person, the third person, if he had notice
of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary
any profit which he makes through the use of such information. 72

The Restatement provision supplies what is at best a mere verbal analogy
which offers no firm authority for the extension of insider liability to a new
sphere; for the section is based on the common-law cases involving the receipt
of trade secrets in which a person knowingly acquiring a trade secret by virtue
of breach of duty or indiscretion of a trusted corporate employee is charged
with a trust for the benefit of the corporation. In the securities cases the duty
sought runs not to the corporation itself, but rather to the potential purchasers
and sellers of its stock. Furthermore, the duty dictates that there must be uniform disclosure, not that there has to be no disclosure. A uniform disclosure of
inside information is clearly improper in the ordinary trade secret case, since
there the "outsiders" are competitors. In securities cases, a uniform disclosure
of information does no harm to the corporation, save in "corporate opportunity" cases or in cases where the information disclosed to traders is a trade
secret which would be of value to competitors.
However, the fact that the trade-secret cases do not directly support the
adoption of the Cady, Roberts rule does not mean that their principles are
valueless in determining how far the new rule may be extended. This is true
since the cases proceed on general principles that will prove of far more value
in determining the proper reach of insider liability than efforts to extend the
rule by successively imposing liability on partners, wives, relatives, and other
specific classes of persons.
The trade-secret cases grant relief where information is tortiously acquired or inequitably retained, and deny it where there is independent discovery or analysis of the product. A trade secret is tortiously acquired where a
party deliberately induces its disclosure by a fiduciary or contractor in violation of his obligations. Thus in the early case of Tabor v. Hoffman,7 3 where a
third person induced a contractor possessing an inventor's machinery patterns to allow him to copy and make use of the patterns, relief was granted
even though the same information might eventually have been obtained by
analysis of the finished machine itself. Citing master-servant cases involving
the obligations of former employees, the court observed that "the defendant
72 SEC

Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, at 7 n.17, citing RESTATEMENT, RESThe Supreme Court declined to charge brokerage partners under § 16(h) of
the Exchange Act in Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962), but this result was compelled
by the language of 16(b), which refers only to "officers, directors, and controlling shareholders" and by its restrictive legislative history. See also notes 95 and 96 infra.
73 118 N.Y. 30,23 N.E. 12 (1889), affirming 41 Hun. 5 (1886). See Comment, 64 HARV. L.
REv. 976, 981 (1950). RESTATmNT, RESTnoN § 201(2) has been applied in non-tradesecret situations. See, e.g., Midstate Amusement Corp. v. Rivers, 54 F. Supp. 738 (E.D.
Wash. 1944).
TUTION (1937).
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had no right to obtain [the trade secret] by unfair means or to use it after it
was thus obtained ... because this discovery may be possible by fair means,
it would not justify the use of unfair means, such as the bribery of a clerk."
A dissent took the more familiar view that the third persons "were neither the
servants nor partners of the plaintiff and owed him no duty not owed by the
whole world." 74
Tortious acquisition has also been said to exist where a third person uses
knowledge though aware that it was revealed by mistake or breach of obligation. 75 Direct prying into a possessor's affairs is likewise said to constitute
76
tortious acquisition, as where an outsider rifles a corporation's papers.
Where disclosure is innocently received, and a notice of breach of duty is later
forthcoming, the information, if used, is said to have been inequitably retained. In all such cases, liability for inequitable retention begins to run from
77
the time of notice of the wrong.
The trade-secret cases make it clear that use of knowledge acquired by independent discovery or analysis of a product does not create liability.78 In addition information that is freely disclosed need not be held in trust by a recipient: "Thus if one freely gives full information about the state of his accounts to trade associations, credit agencies, or others who request it, the
possession, disclosure or use of the same information can hardly cause...

harm." 79 Though the categories of tortious acquisition and inequitable reten74118 N.Y. at 37, 2 N.E. at 13; See also 2 REsTATEwNT, AGENcy § 312, comment c
(1933); Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303, 306 (10th Cir. 1943) (third party inducing
geophysicist to disclose confidential information resulting from oil company survey held
constructive trustee); RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 759 (1939).
75 Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 Atl. 4 (1904) (manufacturer held as constructive trustee where railroad receiving secret plans from one of its
suppliers revealed them to supplier's competitor to stimulate competition); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 757(d): "If the actor has notice that the information is disclosed to him by mistake
and that it is another's trade secret, good faith requires that he does not take advantage of
the mistake and he is under a duty not to disclose or use the secret."
76
4RETATEMENT, TORTS §§ 757(a), 759, comment c (1939): "Among the means which are
improper are theft, trespass, bribing or otherwise inducing employees or others to reveal the
information in breach of duty, fraudulent misrepresentations, threats of harm by unlawful
conduct, wire tapping, procuring one's own employees or agents to become employees of the
other for purposes of espionage, and so forth." See 2 CALLMANN, UNFAIR CorWEITmoN AND

TRADE MARKs 861-63 (2d ed. 1950).
77
Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 542, 73 Ad. 603 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1909) (trade secret); Edelstein v. Edelstein, 1 De. G.J. & S. 199 (1863) (trade-mark
infringement). 4 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 758(b): "But one who actually pays value in good
faith prior to receipt of notice... is relieved of the duty.... A change of position in good
faith may also have this effect." Morrison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241 (1851). See Conmar Products
Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.).
78 Gilbert v. General Motors Corp., 41 F. Supp. 525 (W.D.N.Y. 1951).
79
ESTATEMENT, TORTS § 759, comment b (1939); Sandlin v. Johnson, 152 F.2d 8, 11
(8th Cir. 1945); McClary v. Hubbard, 97 Vt. 222, 122 Atl. 469 (1923). Compare New York
Stock Exchange, Educational Circular 151 (Dec. 15, 1961) which observed that "The Ex-
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tion may be applied with relative ease to securities trading, the trade-secret
rule exonerating outsiders from liability for use of freely disclosed information poses more difficult problems in cases where the disclosure is only to
inquirers and does not take the form of a public announcement. The extent
to which such disclosures should be held to create insider liability should de-

pend on the nature of the information revealed. Thus if investment analysts
touring a factory are told of a new piece of equipment or even of an anticipated decline in earnings in the coming year, it would seem unreasonable to
compel public disclosure of the information thus obtained, since a rule that
would oblige all traders to deal on the basis of a uniform ignorance of corporate affairs would seem unworkable. However, where the information confided to all comers relates to a fundamental corporate change, or a change in
policy that directly affects security holders qua security holders, e.g., merger,
sale of assets, dividend cuts, or stock conversions, application of trade-secret
principles immunizing use of information freely disclosed to inquirers would
work considerable unfairness and a more severe rule requiring disclosure to
the market would seem warranted.
The appeal of the trade-secret cases as a principle of decision lies in the universality of the rules which they propound.80 In this respect, of course, they
suffer from some (f the supposed defects of an "any person" rule, but the
requirements of proof of notice of a fiduciary breach will operate to make
prosecution difficult if not impossible in cases where relationships are remote.81
change has received numerous inquiries concerning... Cady Roberts.... It does not seem

to the Exchange that the opinion questions the ordinary practices of analysts and brokers
seeking and using corporate information of the type company officials would give to anyone
having a legitimate interest in the company." The circular warned against the use by brokerage firms of confidential information received from directors, a warning reiterated at a later
time. See Wall Street Journal, June 25, 1962, p. 10, col. 2.
80"We do not deem it advisable to lay down any hard and fast rule.... Were we to do
so, a certain class of gentlemen of the J. Rufus Wallingford type--'they toil not, neither do
they spin'-would lie awake nights endeavoring to conceive some devious and shadowy way
of evading the law. It is more advisable to deal with each case as it arises." State v.'Whiteaker,
188 Ore. 656, 661,247 Pac. 1072, 1079 (1926). Cf. Stonemets v. Head, 248 Mo. 243, 263, 154
S.W. 108, 114 (1913): "Messieurs, the Fraud-Feasors, would like nothing half so well as for
courts to say they would go thus far and no further in its pursuit." The dictum in Allcard v.
Skinner, 36 Ch.D. 145, 183 (1887) may now be hyperbole, however: "No court has ever attempted to define fraud." Cf. Webb v. Rorke, 2 Sch. & Lef 661, 666 (Ir. Ch. 1806) (cited at
3 Loss 1446) where it is said, "If a case arises or fraud ...to which even no principle already
established can be applied, a new principle must be established to meet the fraud ... for the
possibility will always exist that human ingenuity in contriving fraud will go beyond any
cases which have before occurred."
81On the nature of "notice," see 1 REsTATEMENT, AGENCY § 9 (1933): "A person has
notice of a fact if he or his agent knows the fact, has reason to know it, should know it, or
has been given a notification of it." But compare REsTATEmENT, REsTrruTiON § 202, comment
a,(1937): knowledge may be required to impose a constructive trust where third person disposes of property with notice but without knowledge and acquires other property in exchange.
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Problems of administration have in the past been thought to raise decisive
objections to a broad rule. An early draft of section 16(b) of the Exchange Act
was revised to eliminate a section which would have provided that:
[A]ny profit made by any person to whom... unlawful disclosure shall
have been made, in respect of any transaction or transactions in such registered security within a period not exceeding six months after such disclosure shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer unless such person
shall have had no reasonable ground to believe that the disclosure was
82
confidential or was made not in the performance of corporate duties.
These administrative problems, however, are not likely to arise to as great
an extent where a harsh provision of this nature is not at issue. It would have
been arbitrary and frequently unjust to require any person receiving information from a director to purge himself of all short-swing profits in that director's
corporation even where the profits bore no relationship to the information
thus received. 8 3 The possibilities for entrapment would seem considerable
under such a rule, since only disclosure need be proven and since an insider
could in effect disqualify any person he chose from trading in the stock of his
corporation. Different considerations would apply were rule lOb-5 to be read
to include any person receiving information from insiders. For here, not only
disclosure but causation must be shown; the trading and profits must derive
from the use of the inside information to be actionable.
Nevertheless, the possibility that receipt of information might in practice be
presumed to be the cause of an innocent transaction has aroused anxiety
about the possible application of the new rule.8 4 This is so even though the
decision in the Cady, Roberts case may be read as being predicated on the findH.R. 7852, 73d Congress, 2d Sess., § 15(b).
Wolverton: How are you going to catch anybody?
Mr. Corcoran: Somebody will peach.
Mr. Wolverton: Somebody who was not in.
Mr. Corcoran: Somebody that was not in.
Mr. Corcoran: This information might turn up in tax returns; it might turn up in
investigations; it might turn up in lawsuits-when thieves fall out-it might turn up in a lot
of ways.
Mr. Corcoran: ... Suppose a man is very close to the inside of a corporation and
there is circumstantial evidence turning up, for instance, in tax returns, or otherwise, that he
did buy stock just before a lift and sold out within six months, and that he was very, very
close to a certain officer or director of the company. That might be enough to prove a case
against him... you might from stock records find that somebody on the inside bought just
before a dividend was raised.
Stock Exchange Regulation. Hearing on H.R. 7852 Before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 135-73 (1934).
84 Phelps, Hazards of the Stock Market, Atlantic Monthly 81-82 (April 1962). Cf.
Windels, supra note 69, at 182 where it is said that: "A very circumspect broker who is also a
director may actually be at a disadvantage in the use of information that, although not publicly reported, is generally known, to the great detriment of his customers who look to him
for advice in investment matters."
82

83 Mr.
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ing that "the record does not support the contention that Gintel's sales were
merely a continuance of his prior schedule of liquidation." 8 5
It thus seems possible that a more limited rule than that suggested by the
trade-secret cases will be adopted. Since the trade-secret cases look only at the
knowledge and conduct of the recipient of information, their principle may be
limited in two ways: First, by considering the degree of complicity in the outsider's trading of the fiduciary,8 6 whether he is an officer, director or controlling shareholder, or second, by considering the relationship of the recipient
of information to the trust.
There is ample support at common law for a rule which would impose liability on an insider disclosing information to a third person with knowledge
that the recipient would trade in the stock. Benefit to the insider himself is not
necessary for the transaction to supply the basis of liability since common-law
doctrine extends beyond the agency principles previously discussed. Trust
analogies are appropriate as the law lays greater stress on the fiduciary functions of directors.
In some cases at common law, the trustee himself may be charged for profits made by third persons. Thus in the case of Mosser v. Darrow,8 7 a reorganization trustee allowing an employee of the debtor trusts to deal in trust securities with the estate was charged with the employee's profits for the benefit of
the trust, even though the fiduciary did not benefit. The court declared that
"that which the trustee had no right to do he had no right to authorize and...
the transactions were as forbidden for the benefit of others as they would have
been on behalf of the trustee himself... [It] is a case of a wilful and deliberate
setting up of an interest in employees adverse to that of the trust." The absence
of detriment to the corporation was deemed irrelevant on well-settled principles which allow a trustee to be surcharged for the proceeds of self-dealing,8S

85 The Commission also made the ambiguous observation that "the practical problem
envisaged by respondents in effecting appropriate disclosures in connection with transactions
on the Exchange are easily avoided where, as here, all the registeredbroker-dealerneed do is
to keep out of the market until the established procedures for public release of the information are carried out instead of hastening to execute transactionsin advance of, and in frustration of, the objectives of the release." (Emphasis added.) SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 6668, p. 11.

86 The Cady, Roberts result clearly rejects this possible limitation. The Commission took
the view that it was "not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications"
(SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, p. 6), and inferentially adopted the staff's
position that "Gintel's duty is not to be determined by any such fortuitous technicalities.
His obligations depend upon what he did in the light of his own knowledge." (Memorandum
for Division of Trading and Exchanges, p. 7).
87 341 U.S. 267,272 (1951). The trustee surcharged in Mosserwas later allowed to recover
from the employees on the theory that he was subrogated to the trust's claim against them.
Matter of Federal Facilities Realty Trust, 220 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1955).
8
8 An earlier case also arising in the Seventh Circuit was in effect overruled by the Mosser
decision. In re Breger Kosher Sausage Co., 129 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1942) (trustee not charged
for loss to business resulting from loan of funds to employee). But see In re Real Estate
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including his share of commissions 89 and partnership profits,90 regardless of
whether there was loss to the trust.
Results similar to that in the Mosser case have been reached in bankruptcy
cases where the courts have exercised their general equity powers 9 ' or have
acted under statutory provisions proscribing "beneficial interest[s]," direct or
indirect, to limit the compensation paid to attorneys and other reorganization
officials 92 where information was disclosed to wives, 93 distant relatives,9 4 law9 S
Mortgage Guaranty Co., 55 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (trustee not liable where beneficiary consents); In re Portex Oil Co., 43 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ore. 1942) (trustee not liable
where employee's profit concealed from him); Speight v. Gant, 22 Ch. 727 (1883); Exparte
Belchier, 1 Arnb. 217, 27 Eng. Rep. 144 (1794).
"Mhe prohibition is not merely against injuring the estate-it is against profiting out of
the position of trust." Mosser v. Darrow, supra note 87, at 273. See also Michoud v. Girod,
4 How. (45 U.S.) 503 (1846); Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106 (1914); Jackson v. Smith,
254 U.S. 586 (1921); Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros., 1 Macq. 461, 472 (1954), citing the civil
law rule in DiGEST 18.1.34.7: "A guardian cannot buy the property of a ward. The same rule
extends to similar cases, that is, to those of curators, agents, and those who transact the
business of others." 5 CivmL LAW 11 (Scott trans. 1932) quoting PAUL., ON Tia EDICT 33.
See also MACKiNTOsHf, ROMAN LAW OF SALE 67 (1892). But compare DIGEsr 27.8.5.23;
3 VoEr, COMMENTARY ON THE PANDECTS 265-66 (Gane trans. 1956) (exceptions where judi-

cial sale or consent of co-trustee). For the application of the principle in modem RomanDutch law, see the elaborate discussion in Osry v. Hirsch, Loubser & Co., 1922 So. Afr. L.R.
(C.P.D.) 531-67 (agent liable for profit on resale of ostrich feathers bought of principal at
public auction sale).
89 Crites, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 322 U.S. 408, 414, 418 (1944) (receiver surcharged
for commission received on profits from resale of property bought from trust).
90 Albers v. Dickinson, 127 F.2d 957 (8th Cir. 1942) (trustee charged for his share of
corporation profits where corporation was operated like partnership); In re Midland United
Corp., 64 F. Supp. 399, 417 (D. Del. 1946) (disallowance under § 249 of Bankruptcy Act
where trustee profited through closely held corporation); In re Webster Loose Leaf Filing
Co., 252 Fed. 959 (D.N.J. 1918) (trustee charged for wife's share of partnership where wife
served as his agent). See also Blau v. Lehman, 288 F.2d 786,791 (2d Cir. 1961) (insider liable
for share of partnership profits under § 16(b) of Exchange Act though share renounced);
Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952); Sexton v. Sword Steamship Line, 118 F.2d
708 (2d Cir. 1941) (trustee's share of partnership profits offset against allowance under
§ 77B of Bankruptcy Act though share renounced).
91
In addition to their general equity powers to reduce or withhold compensation, courts
are accorded additional powers by § 249 of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that "no
compensation or reimbursement shall be allowed to any person acting in a representative or
fiduciary capacity, who at any time after assuming to act in such capacity has purchased or
sold... claims or stock, or by whom or for whose account... claims or stock have, without the prior consent or subsequent approval of the judge, been acquired or transferred."
52 Stat. 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1958). The act also empowers courts to surcharge
fiduciaries, or limit to cost the value of claims or stock purchased by them.
92 Reorganization committeemen under § 249 of the Bankruptcy Act are fiduciaries for
all share and bond holders, not merely those whom they represent. The act merely codifies a
result reached at common law. In re Republic Gas Corp., 14 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1936);
In re Paramount Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Nichol v. Sensenbrenner,
220 Wis. 165, 263 N.W. 650 (1935). It is not clear whether shareholders representing themselves in reorganization proceedings are held under § 249 as fiduciaries to all security
holders. See Finn v. Childs Co., 181 F.2d 431, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1950). Compare 18
N.Y.U.L.REv. 399, 475 (1941) with 6 CoLUrER, BANRauPTcY 4594 (14th ed. 1958). Officers
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or brokerage partners, 96 clients, 97 and other persons. Knowledge of the outsider's trading,98 or advice to him to trade, 99 appears to have been requisite to
and supervisory employees of debtors in possession are not fiduciaries under § 249, but are
still subject to the inherent equity powers we here discuss. In re Nazareth Fairgrounds &
Farmers' Market Inc., 296 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. grantedsubnom. Wolf v. Weinstein,
369 U.S. 837 (1962). Depositary banks appear to be fiduciaries, at least at common law,
Matter of Marquette Manor Bldg. Corp., 97 F.2d 733, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 648 (1938), and
probably under § 249, 6 COLLiER, supra,at 4593; contra, Matter of Brown Co., 26 F. Supp.
275 (D. Me. 1941).
93 See Surface Transit, Inc. v. Saxe, Bacon & O'Shea, 266 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 862 (1959) (disallowances under § 249 of Bankruptcy Act); SEC v. Dumaine, 218
F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1954) (disallowance under Public Utility Holding Company Act, Rule
U-62); In re Midland United Co., 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1946) (disallowance under § 249
and equity powers); In re Central States Elec. Corp., 112 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Va.), aff'd,
206 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Henis v. Egan, 346 U.S. 899 (1953); In re Inland
Gas Corp., 73 F. Supp. 785, 791 (RD. Ky. 1947). See also the cases relating to strict trustees,
collected in 131 A.L.R. 990 (1940). Contra,Nichols v. SEC, 211 F.2d 412,416,418 (2d Cir.)
(L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (reversing Long Island Lighting Co., 34
S.E.C. 600, 618, 620 (1953)); In re Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 120 F. Supp. 460 (D.
Mass. 1953) (no disallowance under § 249).
94
fBerner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949) (no disallowance
under § 249 but disallowance under equity powers). Compare Long Island Lighting Co.,
34 S.E.C. 600, 618, 620 (1953) (no disallowance under rule U-62).
95
In re Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 37 F. Supp. 708, 711 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (disallowance under § 249 where partner traded).
96
In re Mountain States Power Co., 118 F.2d 405,407 (3d Cir. 1941) (disallowance under
equity powers where brokerage house traded, though no profits). Compare In re Midland
United Co., 64 F. Supp. 399, 417 (D. Del. 1946) (no disallowance under § 249 or equity
powers where brokerage house executed unsolicited orders).
97
Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 35 S.E.C. 150 (1953) (disallowance under Rule U-62
where attorney's client traded). But compare Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d
917, 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950) (no disallowance under § 249 where
attorney's client traded, since no control over his conduct).
98 Compare In re Central States Elec. Corp. 112 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Va.), motion for
leave to appealdenied,206 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Henis v. Egan, 346 U.S.
899 (1953); Surface Transit, Inc. v. Saxe, Bacon & O'Shea, 266 F.2d 862 (2d Cir,), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 862 (1959) (disallowances under § 249 where knowledge of wife's trading);
In re Midland United Co., 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947) (disallowance under § 249 and equity
powers where knowledge ofwife's trading); andSECv. Dumaine, 218 F.2d 308, 315 (1st Cir.
1954) (disallowance under rule U-62 where knowledge of wife's trading), with SEC v.
Dumaine, 218 F.2d 308, 315 (1st Cir. 1954) (dictum); Nichols v. SEC, 211 F.2d 412, 416,418
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (no disallowance under rule U-62 where no
knowledge of wife's trading, though requirement of knowledge could be abrogated by rule);
In re Philadelphia & Reading Iron Co., 61 F. Supp. 120, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (no disallowance under § 249 where knowledge of wife's trading though requirement of knowledge could
be abrogated by statute); Long Island Lighting Co., 34 S.E.C. 600, 618, 620 (1953) (no disallowance under rule U-62 where no knowledge of relative's trading). But see In re Eastern
Gas & Fuel Associates, 120 F. Supp. 460 (D. Mass. 1953) (no disallowance under rule U-62
though knowledge of wife's trading); In re Inland Gas Corp., 73 F. Supp. 785,791 (RD. Ky.
1947) (disallowance under § 249 where no knowledge of wife's trading); In re Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 37 F. Supp. 708, 711 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (disallowance under § 249 where
no knowledge of law partner's trading); In re Mountain States Power Co., 35 F. Supp. 307
(D. Del. 1940), modified and aff'd, 118 F.2d 405, 407 (3d Cir. 1941) (disallowance under
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liability in these cases, as was true in the Mosser case. Although statutory

provisions demand "beneficial interest," knowledge of a wife's transaction has
been treated as equivalent to beneficial interest, so that as to wives, but not
other relatives, the statutory and equitable prohibitions are little different.
This requirement of knowledge of an outsider's use of information is the chief
limitation upon insider liability under the Mosser rule. Following the Mosser
decision, corporation directors and fiduciary institutions might have felt concem that they might be held liable, not only for the profits realized by employees acting on the basis of inside information, but for profits obtained by
their employees as a result of exchanges of inside information with the employees of other organizations. This concern had little basis. A corporation
might fairly be held liable where it knew of transactions in its own stock by its
own employees, since in such cases it would ordinarily possess the power to
control such transactions. This controlling power would not exist over transactions by employees of other corporations, or to trading in the securities of
other corporations. If such transactions were to be reached, a rule that would
charge the person making use of inside information was required. A rule
that is limited to cases involving complicity on the part of a fiduciary is
likely to prove unsatisfactory as a thorough solution to the problems of insider
trading, and this limitation was properly rejected by the SEC in Cady,
Roberts.eo

Substantial authority exists at common law for a rule that would hold
liable outside persons possessing undisclosed information. The majority of
such cases proceed on master-servant or agency principles, and charge the
outside person for the benefit of the corporation rather than for the benefit of
the purchaser or seller of stock. In the case of Brophy v. Cities Service Co.,o1

an ordinary employee purchasing stock of a corporation on the open market in
anticipation of an increase in its value that would result from the execution
§ 249 where brokerage house traded contrary to partner's instructions to execute orders
only); 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 4590 (Supp. 1958) (knowledge of wife's trading should be
presumed save where estranged spouse).
99
Berner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949).
100 See note 86 supra. As to another facet of the Mosser rule, see Kaplan, Conflict of
Interest in Corporations,UNivERsrrY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, CONFERENCE ON CONFLICT
OF INrSREsr 34, 47 (Conference Series No. 17, 1961) ("It could also be contended with considerable cogency that a director who knows that another director is purchasing securities on
the basis of confidential information may incur liability for failure to prevent such action by
his colleague. A trustee has the obligation to prevent a co-trustee from violating their joint
trust.... The same result might also be reached by yet another line of reasoning. The
Brophy case... indicates that it is the corporation which has a cause of action against a
fiduciary who uses confidential information for his own profit; it might therefore be argued
that a corporate asset is involved, and that it is the obligation ofeach director to protect such
corporate asset or be liable for failure to do so.")
101 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Comment, 63 HAv. L. REv. 1446 (1950).
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of the company's undisclosed plan to buy up its own stock was held liable to
the corporation for his profits even though no loss to it was shown.102
In other cases at common law, the courts have indicated a willingness to
charge outside persons on an agency theory where an insider made investment
decisions on behalf of a relative or where a husband acted as his wife's agent in
carrying out a transaction. 103 In these cases, the insider's information was imputed to his principal, who was held as a trustee. Where an insider is authorized by an associate to procure information, 104 or acts for an associate who
ratifies,105 he may be treated, under ordinary common-law principles, as the
associate's agent. The Supreme Court in a dictum in the recent case of Blau v.
Lehman'06 indicated a willingness to apply this agency principle to cases arising under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, declaring that "Lehman Brothers
would be a 'director' of Tidewater if, as petitioner's complaint charged Lehman actually functioned as a director through Thomas, who had been deputized by Lehman to perform a director's function not for himself but for
Lehman." But the giving of a "tip" to an outside person, without more, has
been held not to be within this principle, 0 7 nor sufficient to establish the recipient of the tip as a confederate of the insider. In cases arising under section
212 of the Bankruptcy Act,108 the courts have refused to limit to cost, for the
benefit of the corporation, claims purchased by relatives of the insider acting
102 Loss was alleged but not proved. The case nonetheless resembles other cases involving
corporate opportunity or use of corporate funds in that there was possible prejudice to the

corporation. Cf.Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 173, 2 A.2d 225, 241, aff'd, 23 Del. Ch.
255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939); 63 HARv. L. REV. 1446 (1950).
103 In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 173 F.2d 944, 951 (2d Cir.) (dictum), aff'd without consideration of the point sub nom. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949)
(insider investing for relative); In re Frazin & Oppenheim, 181 Fed. 307, 311 (2d Cir. 1910)
(wives charged with husbands' knowledge of fiduciary's status where purchase of property
from fiduciary who had unlawfully acquired it from trust estate).
10
4R=TATrEMENr, AG NcY § 272 (1933): "Mhe liability of a principal is affected by the
knowledge of an agent concerning a matter as to which he acts within his power to bind the
principal or upon which it is his duty to give the principal information."
105
RmSATEMENT, AGENcy § 85 (1933): "[R]atification does not result from the affirmance
of an act, unless the one acting purports to act on account of another."
106 368 U.S. 403, 410 (1962).
107 Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949). One could argue that directors should be penalized for giving advice based on non-crucial facts that a director might
lawfully use in his own investment decisions. "[Tihere is a valid reason for allowing a
director to buy shares for himself, which does not extend to informing outsiders of the facts
on which he is personally free to act; for it is usually of interest to a corporation to have a
director increase his stake in it." Berner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218, 221
(2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, C. J.) (dictum). But apart from the paradox involved, such a distinction would smack of the early view which regarded inside information as part of the
appropriate emolument of directors.
108 52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 612 (1958).
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for their own account where the insider had no interest in the transaction. 109
Likewise, an outside businessman, a management consultant, dealing with the
corporation was held not liable under this provision of the Bankruptcy Act.110
Agency theories have also been invoked at common law to hold a wife liable
for misrepresentations to sellers of stock where her husband acted for her in
purchasing stock."' The courts at common law, however, have not held an

employee liable to a seller for misrepresentations."

2

SEC cases arising under

rule lOb-5 shed little light on the liability to buyers or sellers of outside persons doing business with the corporation or extracting information from it.

Where a director of a corporation planning to purchase another concern's
assets buys stock for his own account without disclosing the acquisition plan,
commentators are united in the view that he should be held liable, 11 3 although

the SEC cases are by no means so clear. 1 4 A broker inducing a corporate employee to transmit information to him was also held liable to a purchaser
In re Franklin Bldg. Co., 178 F.2d 805, 807-08 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied sub nom.
109
Simonsen v. Emmerling, 339 U.S. 978 (1950); In re Philadelphia & W. Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738
(E.D. Pa. 1946).
110 In re Philadelphia & W. Ry., supra note 109.
111 Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1885): "Inall of the transactions connected with
the purchase of the stock Traer acted as the agent of his wife, who knew that her husband was
a trustee holding the assets for the stockholders ... and knew their value, and was guided in
her purchases by his advice and direction. She knew that Tappan was ignorant of the value
of the assets, and she had knowledge of the devices used by her husband.. . ." In other
cases, however, an insider acting as agent for his wife has himself been charged with deceit
on the theory that he benefits from the wife's transaction. Broffe v. Horton, 172 F.2d 489
(2d Cir. 1949) (insider liable to fellow insider for failure to disclose identity in purchasing for
wife, who exercised independent judgment and had'separate brokerage account). The court
cited Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1939), a tax case involving a short-term trust
created by a husband for the benefit of his wife, the husband remaining as trustee. The
Broffe case goes beyond both Helvering and the definition of beneficial ownership promulgated by the SEC under § 16(b), which demands an understanding that the husband is to
receive "benefits substantially equivalent to those of ownership" or "the power to vest or
revest in himself the full legal and equitable title at once, or at some future time, without
payment of more than a nominal consideration." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
175 (April 16, 1935), cited in 2 Loss 1101. Cf. the Broffe-like view adopted by the SEC in
relation to its own employees: 17 C.F.R. § 200. 33 (Supp. 1962). The Broffe case on its facts
is not inconsistent with the bankruptcy cases cited in note 93 supra, since the courts have
treated knowledge of a wife's transaction as equivalent to "beneficial interest, direct or indirect," though declining to imply either knowledge or beneficial interest from the existence
of the marriage relation itself. Cf. Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N.Y. Supp. 768
(1932) (director purchasing as agent for fellow director charged though no beneficial interest,
subject to accounting with his principal).
112 Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho 464, 196 Pac. 208 (1921).
113 3 Loss 1451-52; Comment, 39 CALu. L. REv.429, 434 (1951); Comment, 59 YALE
L.J. 1120, 1134 (1950).
114 See Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (purchaser of corporation held
for stock purchases between contract and closing). But compare Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C.
623, 626 n.2 (1946), where the Commission said in a dictum in a case involving a purchaser of
a corporation buying stock through a broker: "There is a substantial question whether respondent's purchases were in fact made on behalf of an 'insider' or a person having some
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under rule l0b-5, but whether the result here was dependent on special duties
5
as a broker is not clear."
Few consistent principles emerge from prior cases, save that in all instances
where liability has been found, a relationship between insider and outsider
existed that went beyond the mere transmission of information. Either the
outsider purchased through the insider, or he induced or deputized the insider
to procure the information, or he obtained the information as a result of an
employment relationship or he traded with the tacit consent of an insider who
knew of the transaction and was in a position to control it. Insistence on some
such bilateral relationship would eliminate most opportunities for systematic
fraud while guarding against possibilities of entrapment and sterilization of
contemplated transactions. This, indeed, seems the rule announced in Cady,
Roberts, where "the existence of a relationship" was said to be one of the
bases of liability. But adoption of more generalized principles of tortious acquisition and inequitable retention are necessary if all transactions are to be
reached and if the law is to supply a meaningful guide to conduct. Relationship
to the fiduciary is relevant where liability to a trust itself is at issue. Its relevance diminishes where the duty is not to a trust but to investors, and where
the law must concern itself with the cultivation of standards of fair dealing
meaningful to traders acting in a wide variety of situations.
3. Exchange Transactions.-Inthe Cady, Roberts decision, the Commission
rejected contentions that rule 1Ob-5 did not apply to sales of stock, to transactions involving persons not shareholders at the time of purchase, to exchange
6
transactions and to cases where privity with a buyer had not been proven."
In holding the rule applicable to sales as well as purchases, the Commission
would appear to stand on what is now reasonably firm ground. The Commission could, to be sure, have brought its action under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which applies only to sellers.11 7 It chose not to do so,
fiduciary obligation to ...stockholders." See also Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F.
Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Cf. Mills v. Saijem Co., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1955),
and the English law summarized in 2 Loss 896 n.159.
'is
Herbert L. Honohan, 13 S.E.C. 754 (1943). Similar suggestions have been made as to
Cady, Roberts, though the generality of the Commission's language might seem to preclude
such an interpretation. See Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 736, 742-47 (1962), where the broker's
"position as part of the policing mechanism of the stock market" is stressed.
116 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, pp. 9-10 (Nov. 8, 1961).
117 Though the wording of § 17(a) and rule lOb-5 is similar, there are a number of differences between the two provisions: (1) § 17(a) applies to activities "in the ... sale of securities," while rule lob-5 refers to activities "in connection with the... sale." (2) § 17(a)
makes it unlawful "to obtain money or property" by means of false statements; rule 10b-5
provides it is illegal "to make any such statements." (3) Rule lob-5 specifically refers to "any
facility of any national securities exchange"; § 17(a) does not. (4) the venue provisions of the
Exchange Act are broader than those of the Securities Act. See Loss, SEculunas REGULATION 1176 (1951). (5) The Exchange Act makes it a misdemeanor to ignore a Commission
subpoena; the Securities Act does not. (6) Exchange Act violation is a ground for suspension
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relying on the fact that rule lOb-5 refers in terms to "the purchase or sale of
any security" and on the action of the SEC in striking the limiting words "by
a purchaser" from the title to the rule in 1951.118 The availability of an administrative rather than criminal remedy for violation of the rule was probably
the decisive consideration in inducing the Commission to proceed under rule
lOb-5. However, the implied civil remedy under the rule may also have been a
factor, since it is doubtful that section 17(a) supplies the basis for civil liability.l" 9
The Commission's rejection of attempts to limit application of the rule to
cases involving purchasers who were already stockholders 20 rested primarily
on the dictum of Judge Learned Hand in Gratz v. Claughton,'2 1 a case involving insider trading under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act:
fflhe director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very
sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantage of
his position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary, although
he was forbidden to do so, once the buyer had become one. Certainly this
is true, when the buyer knows he is buying of a director or an officer, for he
expects to become the seller's cestui que trust. If the buyer does not know,
he is entitled to assume that if his seller in fact is already a director or
22
officer, he will remain so after the sale.1
from membership on an exchange or in the National Association of Securities Dealers;
Securities Act violation is not. (7) It is doubtful whether § 17(a) of the Securities Act supplies
the basis for implied civil liability. See generally Loss, Sscuunras REGULATION 832 (1951).
(8) Criminal penalties under rule 10b-5 are limited by § 32(a) of the Exchange Act, which
provides that "no person shall be subject to imprisonment [as opposed to fine] ... for the
violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or
regulation."
118 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3634, 16 Fed. Reg. 7928 (1951). The rule
has been held applicable to sales in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,365 U.S. 870 (1961);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). There is a split as to whether the rule is applicable to sales covered by the express civil liability provisions of the 1933 Act for the purposes of private suits. See Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962)
and cases there cited.
11 9 See 3 Loss 1784-87.
120 Several commentators have suggested this limitation. See Loss, SEcUarrms REGULAnON 833 (1951); Note,42VA. L. REv. 537, 546, 563 (1956). One writer carries it even further:
"Mhe fiduciary relation arises because of the then ownership by the shareholder of specific
shares, and if the transaction is unrelated to those shares-as when the shareholder proposes
to buy additional shares from an 'insider' it may be concluded that the shareholder should be
in no different position from any other purchaser vis-d-vis the insider." FEuER, PERSONAL
Limnn.rry OF CORPORATE OrFicEs AND Dnscroas 174 (1961).
121 The Cady, Roberts opinion noted in passing that "the record contains no evidence to
indicate the correctness of the assumption, upon which respondents' contention is apparently based, that none of the persons who purchased the Curtiss-Wright shares sold by
Gintel during the interval in question were already shareholders of that company."
122 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
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The defendant in Cady, Roberts attempted to distinguish Hand's dictum by
arguing that it related to a statute arbitrarily imposing liability on insiders irrespective of the identity of the other party to the transaction, 23 although
Hand was addressing himself to the question of the constitutionality of the
16(b) provision by demonstrating that it was not arbitrary in extending a
prohibition to sales to persons not shareholders.
The relevance of Hand's reasoning might have been more convincingly attacked on the ground that it related to the duties of directors, officers, and
controlling shareholders-persons who may be assumed to owe a continuing
fiduciary duty to the purchaser of stock after he becomes a shareholder. It can
hardly be argued that a buyer is entitled to assume that if his non-insider seller
possesses inside information, he will continue to possess it and hence owe the
buyer a fiduciary duty after the sale when the inside information will have
ceased to have value. To the extent that Hand's reasoning stands for the
proposition that one owes fiduciary obligations to those whom one induces to
become one's cestuis, it is inapplicable to the Cady, Roberts situation.
However, the possessor of inside information can be held to owe fiduciary
duties to nonstockholders on more fundamental principles than those invoked
by Judge Hand in Gratz Y. Claughton. Prior to the passage of the statutory
prohibitions in section 249 of the Bankruptcy Act, the common law prohibited
reorganization committeemen from purchasing nondeposited bonds even
though they were not strictly fiduciaries for shareholders whom they did not
represent:
It may be suggested, and in effect is argued, that the committeemen were
trustees only for depositors, that their purchases were from nondepositors,
and that hence there was no violation of any right of the depositors....
As I see it, the evil from purchasing nondeposited bonds impinges upon the
reason for the rule precisely as would purchasing from a depositor. The
prohibition against dealing in bonds of an issue of which a portion.., is
being handled by a committee grows out of the requirement that a trustee
have no interest, or even temptation, to act adversely to the beneficiaries of
his trust. Trafficking in any bonds of the issue would or might beget a desire
to buy low or to sell high, The confidence reposed by depositors, as a body,
in their trustee, would be abused by such behavior on his part in like
fashion and to the same extent irrespective of whether the bonds dealt in
were owned by a depositor or a non-depositor.124
It is thus doubtful that the distinction contended for existed even at common law,' 25 which as to strict trusts at least looked to the nature of the trading
123

Reply Memorandum for Cady, Roberts, p. 7.

124 In re Republic Gas Co., 2 SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, AcTrivnfs, PERSONNEL, AND FuNCTIONS OF PROTEcTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COM-

MrrrEEs 597, 599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (memorandum of Caffey, J.). See also 2 id. 251-59

(1937); In re Paramount Publix Co., 12 F. Supp. 823, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
125 The Republic Gas case, supra note 124, arose under the very general provisions of
§ 77B of the Bankruptcy Act which provided for compensation "for services rendered." In
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rather than the identity of the opposite party in defining conduct as inappropriate for a fiduciary.
The view that there is no insider liability for transactions over a securities
exchange does find support at common law in the well known case of Goodwin
v. Agassiz,126 a case which has been the subject of warm debate since 1933.127
Advocates of the Goodwin rule urge a number of considerations in its favor.
It is argued that in exchange dealings there is no assurance that a disclosure
will reach a buyer.128 However, this objection has been vitiated by the development of modem communications and the fact that the disclosure will be reflected in the market price. It has also been suggested that where a sale takes
place at a market price, the fact that the buyer has knowledge of a probable
future rise does not prejudice the seller, who sells because he wishes to sell.129
Whatever the merits of this rationale for insider overreaching as to purchases
it is clearly more difficult to justify its use as to insider sales, where the buyer's
stock soon depreciates in value.
In addition, it has been maintained that where insiders purchase publicly
traded stocks through brokers, "the only practical disclosure would open the
field for a broker-speculation."130 However, where an insider privately purchases a publicly traded stock, it would not be unreasonable to require him to
await disclosure to the market. In any event, the Cady, Roberts extension of
Mosser, another reorganization case, the Supreme Court observed that "this was a strict
trusteeship, not one of those quasitrusteeships in which self-interest and representative
interests are combined." 341 U.S. at 271.
126 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). See also Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F.
Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945) (dictum). Compare Judge
Caffey's observation in the Republic Gas case: "It has been urged that the purchases...
were made in the open market and therefore were warranted.... [l]t strikes me that the
contention is, in effect, identical with that already mentioned, that is, with the contention
that a committeeman merits no criticism by buying from a nondepositor." 2 SEC, supra
note 124, at 600.
127 Compare, e.g., BALLANTim, CORPORATIONs 216 (1946) ("Dishonest directors should
not find absolution from retributive justice by concealing their identity from their victims
under the mask of the stock exchange."), with LATrIN, CoRPoRATIoNs 265-66 (1959)
("Should the officer or director who would be required to disclose his inside information
were he dealing personally with the shareholder be required to keep out of the market until
the information he has becomes generally known ? In a practical world, the answer should be
no.").

128 Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Walker, Duty of Disclosure
by a DirectorPurchasingStock from his Stockholders, 32 YALE L.J. 637 (1923).
129 FEuER, op. cit. supra note 120, at 175-76. See also Walker, supra note 128. Contra,
Comment, 59 HARv.L. REv. 769, 774 (1946), where the SEC's duty to promote liquid mar-

kets is advanced as a justification of itself for extension of the rule.
130 LATnN, CoRPoRAnoNs 265-66 (1959). See also In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 173 F.2d
944,949 (2d Cir. 1949) ("As to securities purchasers from over-the-counter traders we should
hesitate to lay down the rule that the purchaser from a broker must make disclosure of why
he thinks the purchase a desirable investment under penalty of being charged with over-

reaching if he fails to do so.").
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insider liability to a broker receiving information from insiders overcomes this
objection.
The practical impossibility of identifying the shareholders to be reimbursed
has also been urged as an objection to liability for exchange transactions.13'
While this argument may have merit in cases involving civil liability to sellers
or purchasers, it is difficult to see its relevance where administrative or criminal penalties are at issue. Where a transaction is forbidden as to all members of
a group, the law will usually create a presumption that it is unlawful even
though participation of a specific member of the group is not shown.132
Application of a disclosure requirement to exchange transactions raises the
acute question of whether an insider must forego a transaction when he is
under a duty to a corporation not to disclose information that might prove
valuable to competitors. Although commentators 3 3 have suggested that insiders in this situation should be allowed to trade without disclosure, a "minority-rule" court at common law would have required the director to forego a
transaction even where a face-to-face transaction necessitating disclosure to
only one person was involved. 3 4 While the question was not directly at issue
in Cady, Roberts, the Commission by way of dictum took the view that:
"If... disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or
unrealistic under the circumstances... the alternative is to forego the transac35
tion."1

It has been suggested that the disclosures of information required of companies listed on exchanges136 sufficiently narrows the possibility of misuse of
131 Comment, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 137, 150 (1939).
132 Compare the principle that "a bill of particulars should be denied where the information sought is peculiarly within the knowledge of the moving party." Porter v. Shoemaker,
6 F.R.D. 438, 441 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
133 E.g., BERLE 176, 183-84. See also Percival v. Wright, [190212 Ch. 421,426; Carpenter
v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 586 (N.Y. 1868); McManus v. Durant, 168 App. Div. 643, 154
N.Y. Supp. 580, 590 (1915). But compare Black v. Simpson, 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E. 1023, 1025
(1913); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN., ch. 31, § 9.7 (1953) ("If the indorsement or delivery of a
certificate (1) was procured by fraud or duress or (2) was made under such mistake as to
make the indorsement or delivery inequitable ... any court may enforce specifically such
right to reclaim the possession of the article as to rescind the transfer thereof." [Emphasis
added.]).
134 Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 368, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (1903) (dictum).
135 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, p. 5.
136 Securities Exchange Act Rule 13(a)(1), Form 10(k) requires submission of an annual
report by listed corporations. Rule 13(a)(13), Form 9(k) requires semiannual reports of
gross sales, operating revenues, net income, extraordinary and special transactions, and
charges and credits to earned surplus. Rule 13(a)(11), Form 8(k) requires reporting of specified changes in the capital and control structure of corporations and extraordinary acquisitions and dispositions of assets within ten days after the close of a calendar month in which
the actions occur. In addition, the New York Stock Exchange requires immediate reporting
of dividend changes and changes in conversion rates, business purchases, redemptions, and
cancellations, subscription rights and changes in officers and directors, in addition to information required by the SEC. NEw YoRK STOCK EXcHANGE, CoMPANY MAtuALA-91-A-104
(1961). See generally 2 Loss 808-17.
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inside information as to render unnecessary the expansion of rule lOb-5 to
reach the few remaining cases. 137 However, there are a sufficient number of
important developments and decisions that are not subject to immediate reporting under either Exchange or SEC rules to justify an expansion of the
general fraud provisions.138 Moreover, when there is a breach of the disclosure
rules, the fraud provisions may supply a private remedy that the rules do
not; and the rules provide no penalties for trading on the basis of inside information where, as in Cady, Roberts, a failure to report is nonculpable and inadvertent. In any event, the notion that exchange reporting requirements place
investors in publicly traded companies in a more favorable position than
holders of stock in closely held concerns has been disputed. "The holder of
stock in a listed exchange corporation," it has been observed, "is practically
never within sight of his company's plants, and not even within astronomical
distance of synthesizing intelligently its bookkeeping system."1 39 Under this
view, reporting requirements merely equalize the position of investors in privately and publicly traded corporations and would not justify a relaxation of
fraud provisions as to the latter.
The Commission rejected the defendants' contention that failure to show
that the seller of stock was in privity with a specific buyer barred administrative action under the rule. The decision took the position that "the absence of
the remedy by a private litigant because of lack of privity does not absolve an
insider from responsibility for fraudulent conduct." But the Commission's
inferential acceptance of the view that mere lack of privity might bar a civil
action in Cady, Roberts is not entirely warranted, though there is rhetoric in
the cases to support it.
In the leading case of Joseph v. Farnsworth Corp., 140 the Second Circuit
affirmed a decision which observed that "a semblance of privity between
vendor and purchaser.., seems to be requisite." The trial court, however,
based this assertion on a dictum by Judge Frank in an earlier case1 41 which
137 FEUER,op. cit. supranote 120, at 175, citing Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp.
625 (D. Del. 1943).
138 E.g., discoveries of mining resources or major new products, important new contracts,

etc. See, e.g., the statement of facts in Donovan v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. Cal. 1955)
(suit dismissed on other grounds). For suggestions as to what facts must be disclosed, see
Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 367-71, 45 S.E. 232, 234-35 (1903); Daum & Phillips, The
Implicationsof Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939, 953-59 (1962). See also note 47 supra. Cf.
United States v. Gilbert, Criminal Indictment No. 62 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1962) (indictment
under § 17(a) for concealment of defalcations).
139 BERLE 180.
140 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). The court of
appeals, affirming per curiam, referred to Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461

(2d Cir. 1951), where recovery was denied to a person who was neither a purchaser nor a
seller.

141 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (recovery allowed to

plaintiff purchasing non-listed common stock from underwriter on the basis of misrepresentations in a preferred stock prospectus).
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suggested that a deliberate fraudulent inducement "successful vis-h-vis the...
shareholders here" was necessary to sustain a cause of action. The requirement in the earlier case was a requirement not of privity in the strict contractual sense but rather of reliance by the buyer. Dissenting in the Farnsworth case, Judge Frank observed that privity of contract was not required at
common law to sustain an action in deceit, but that mere reliance on a misrepresentation by "those persons to whom it is made with the intent to cause
them to act upon it"142 was sufficient.
In the Farnsworth case, the defendant sold stock on the basis of misrepresentations during a six month period ending on October 30, 1948, while the
plaintiff did not institute purchases until November 12. Hence it was clear that
the plaintiff could not possibly have purchased stock from the defendants.
The defendants' misrepresentations were addressed to those persons purchasing stock on the exchange during the six month period that their stock was
being sold; they had no interest in addressing misrepresentations to persons
subsequently purchasing stock. Thus Judge Frank was compelled to join commentators in conceding that the common-law "rule would support the result
in the [Farnsworth] case," 143 and was obliged to attempt, unconvincingly, to
show that the common-law rule had been relaxed sufficiently to allow its application in a case where "the defendant had no intent to influence the particular person or class of persons.""
In Cady, Roberts, unlike Farnsworth,it is possible to view the facts as meeting the strict common-law deceit requirements, at least so far as privity is concerned. The absence of affirmative misrepresentation, however, probably
should bar a private action where privity is lacking, despite extreme suggestions to the contrary by some commentators.145 All that a private suitor might
142 198 F.2d at 885, quoting RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 531 (1938). See Pasley v. Freeman,
3 B. & P. 367, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789) (recovery allowed against defendant falsely commending third person's credit to plaintiff); Peck v. Gurney, 6 H.L. 377 (1873) (recovery
denied to buyer of stock relying on prospectus when stock not bought from issuer), overruling Bedford v. Bagsbaw, 4 H. & N. 537,157 Eng. Rep. 951 (1859) (recovery allowed buyer
relying on false representation made to stock exchange). But compare RSTATEmENT, TORTS
§ 536 (1938) (liability to all persons relying on report required by statute), codified in Securities Exchange Act, § 18(a).
143 4 STAN. L. REv. 308, 312 (1952).
144 Judge Frank relied on cases where recovery was allowed to the ultimate taker of
negotiable instruments and labelled goods. But in those cases the misrepresentation could
be said to have run with the articles sold. See also Davis v. Louisville Trust Co. 181 Fed. 10
(6th Cir. 1910) (recovery allowed where reliance upon false statements made to mercantile
agency). Compare Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441,447 (1931) ("A

representation, even though knowingly false, does not constitute ground for an action of
deceit unless made with the intent to be communicated to the person or class of persons who
act upon it to their prejudice.").
145 One commentator has suggested that the ambit of liability for nondisclosure should be
wider than that for misrepresentation. Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Nondisclosure, 15
TExAS L. Rav. 1, 38-39 (1936): Recovery for nondisclosure should be allowed "not because... conduct.., amounting to an implied representation was relied on... but be-

154

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 30:121

need to show, were misrepresentations present, was that he had purchased
Curtiss-Wright stock during the same period that Gintel was selling. While the
purchaser might not be in privity with Gintel, he would still be among the
class composed of "those persons to whom [a misrepresentation] is made with
the intent to cause them to act upon it,"146 i.e., the class of persons trading on
the Exchange during the definable period in which the stock was sold. Indeed,
the court in Farnsworth allowed leave to plead anew, and "express[ed] no
opinion upon the sufficiency of a complaint alleging reliance by plaintiffs on
[a] November 12, 1948 statement" or alleging later sales by the individual
defendants.' 47
There is nothing in the other decided cases where the privity question has
arisen that is inconsistent with this view. Complaints have been dismissed
where there was a failure to allege that a person making misrepresentations
had sold stock at all, and where the stipulated facts made it clear that the stock
was sold to clients of a brokerage house with which the plaintiff had not
dealt.148 In neither of these cases was there any possibility that the plaintiff
could have bought the shares sold by the defendant.
On the other hand, where the defendant insiders pooled their stock and sold
it to the general public through a broker, a buyer was allowed to maintain an
action even though he could not show that he had purchased stock from any
particular defendant.149 A separate count of the complaint alleging violation
of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 also survived demurrer, even
though the more stringent language of that section gives a cause of action
against a seller only "to the person purchasing such security from him."150
Similarly, a suit against an issuer of bonds by a remote purchaser was allowed
cause entering the contract coupled with... silence as to the defects of the subject matter of
the bargain does not constitute fair conduct. On this basis, reliance is as foreign to this inquiry as it is foreign to the plaintiff's cause of action produced by negligence.... Mhe fact
which makes most misrepresentations false is not of a character which requires a disclosure;
consequently reliance (on a misrepresentation) must necessarily be shown." But this essentially misconceives the nature of liability for negligence, which is not unbounded, but limited
by foreseeability of damage. Where injury to property rather than the person is at issue, and
words rather than physical force the instrumentality involved, foreseeability does not extend
far beyond the parties to a contract, as the Ultramares case, supra note 144, makes clear.
There seems no good reason why the liability of a stocktrader for breach of a statutory duty
of disclosure should be broader than the liability of an accountant for breach of a professional duty of due care. Of course, where doctrines of constructive fraud have broadened
liability for breach of the latter duty, liability for breach of the former may be broadened
also. Compare State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938), with the
cases involving half-truths and brokers' opinions cited at notes 25 and 44 supra. But nondisclosure without more should not impose a duty where privity is lacking.
146 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 231 (1938).
14799 F. Supp. at 706, 707.
148Holmberg v. Williamson, 135 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Donovan v. Taylor,
136 F. Supp. 552, 553 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
149 Buchholtz v. Renard, 188 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

48 Stat.,84 (1933) 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1958).
150
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even though no privity existed.151 Thus courts have sanctioned actions under
the rule where it was either certain or possible that the plaintiff had purchased
stock sold by the defendant. If such persons, whether viewed as possible buyers
or as members of a class to which misrepresentations are addressed, are allowed to sue, the defendant becomes potentially liable for claims on a greater
number of shares of stock than those sold by him. Proof of damage, rather
than privity would then by necessity become the limiting principle. But if rule
lOb-5 is viewed as creating a civil remedy for fraud or deceit, this result is no
different from that which normally obtains in connection with tort actions,152
and is no more objectionable than the result of the Ultramares case.15 3 Different questions arise when the purchaser's suit is for rescission under section
29(b) of the Exchange Act; in such a case, privity, of course, would be re1 4
quired. 5
4. Conflicting fiduciary duties.-The decision in Cady, Roberts flatly rejected the assertion that a broker's fiduciary duty to his discretionary accounts

can justify nondisclosure and declared that "this relationship could not justify
any actions... contrary to law."15 5 Though this holding would seem to be the
least contestible aspect of the Cady, Roberts decision, it has aroused wider
discussion in the public press than any other portion of it.156
151Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers' Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 ,V.D.Ky.
1960), aff'd sub nom. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, CCH FED. SEC. LAW REP.
91,170 (6th Cir. 1962) ("It was not necessary that there be privity between plaintiff and the
defendants in the sale of the bonds.... If this were not so the issuers and brokers could
easily evade liability under the law because it is well known that the original purchasers of
the securities do not always retain them as permanent investments and that the public trades
in securities."). The case was remanded for determination of a factual issue.
152 Cf. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 454 (1789) ("If A by fraud
and deceit cheats B out of £1,000, it makes no difference to B whether A, or any other person pockets that £1,000. He has lost his money, and if he can fix fraud upon A, reason seems
to say that he has a right to seek satisfaction against him.").
153 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
154 15 U.S.C. § 78 cc(b) (1958). See Shulman, Civil Liabilities and the Securities Act, 43
YALE L.J. 227, 229-33 (1933). It has been suggested, however, that a third-party beneficiary
relationship might suffice. See Brouk v. Managed Funds Inc., 286 F.2d 901, 908 (8th Cir.
1961) (dictum).
155 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, p. 11. In support of a contrary position, the respondent relied upon the cases of Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 33 S.E.C. 311 (1952)
and Johnson v. Winslow, 155 Misc. 170, 279 N.Y. Supp. 147 (Sup. Ct. 1935). But those
cases established that a broker owes a duty of full disclosure to those with whom he trades,
not that he owes his trust accounts a duty not to make disclosure to those with whom he
trades. The respondent also saw fit to cite Knapp v. Penfield, 143 Misc. 132, 256 N.Y. Supp.
41 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (backer of musical comedy, "an elderly lady over eighty years of age," held
privileged to induce the breach of an employment contract with Miss America of 1923, who
"was not equal to singing the theme song"). Memorandum for Respondent Gintel, p. 14.
156 See, e.g., Phelps, "The Hazards of the Stock Market," Atlantic Monthly, April, 1962;
Sibley, "Fair Play on Wall Street: Some Dilemmas of a Dealer in Stocks," New Republic,
March 12, 1962; Business Week, Nov. 14, 1961, p. 29. For other comments in the public
press, see CORmR, WALL STREET's SHADY Srnn 115-19 (1962); FULLER, THE MoNEY
CHANGERS 120-22 (1962); Wall Street Journal, Nov. 14, 1961, p. 2, col. 1; Sept. 19, 1962,
p. 1, col. 6.
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It would seem clear that a discussion of conflicting obligations is out of
place in Cady, Roberts. A trust position is not a license to assault the universe. 157 It does not convert the trustee into a twentieth-century Robin Hood,
empowered to exact plunder from others on behalf of worthy causes.15 8 The
fact that a broker can realize personal gain by demonstrating his "market
prowess" on behalf of trust accounts adds to, but does not alter, the principle,
which should apply equally to personal transactions, transactions on behalf of
trust accounts, investment advice and transactions involving charitable organizations. Some guidance as to the potentiality for abuse of transactions in each
of these categories may be derived from a review of SEC experience under

Public Utility Holding Company Act Rule U-62,159 which imposes an absolute ban of the 16(b)-type on all such transactions by reorganization committeemen subject to the act. The rule also prohibits the execution of unsolicited orders by brokerage firms in which committeemen have an interest.
The ban on execution of unsolicited orders has been relaxed with some frequency, 160 while the ban on investment advice has been relaxed, subject to
157 See CAHN, Tm MORAL DECISION 149-53 (1955): "Loyalty then exacts more than the
fulfillment of responsibility; it requires the manager to identify himself with his coadventurers by renouncing some of his own selfish interests and some of his usual economic freedom .... [Fliniteness in the duty of loyalty serves to maintain its moral worth. Sowed
an allegiance to M- , an allegiance which was all the stronger by virtue of being bound
on every side. One of the firm limits on that allegiance was that M - could not have required Sto do on his behalf any act that M - had no moral right to do for his own
account. Sas trustee had neither the duty nor the right to steal in order to benefit his
trust.... It is not a breach of faith to abstain from acts of oppression; on the contrary, the
trustee's promise to avoid using the trust fund to oppress others should be considered one of
the fundamental and unalterable terms of every trust." See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
158 Compare Sibley, supra note 156: "University trustees are often good businessmen.
But is the corporation director free to disclose information to his fellow trustees which may
be of benefit to the University? The conflict here is sharpened because of the nature of the
institution which he serves. Its charitable purpose might be thought to make permissible
some activities barred to individuals operating solely for personal gains."
159 17 C.F.R. 250.62; 17 C.F.R. 250.100.
160 Edward Hopkinson, Jr., 13 S.E.C. 404, 407-10 (1943) ("Inasmuch as the routine
execution of an unsolicited order to buy or sell allows for no exercise of discretion which
might be influenced by inside information, considerations of expediency.., outweigh consideration of protection."); Godfrey B. Simonds, 16 S.E.C. 116 (1944); William C. Langley,
SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 8816 (1949); Benjamin F. Gray, SEC Holding
Company Act Release No. 9687 (1950); Percival E. Jackson, SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 13,812 (1958). Accord, Comment, 62 COLuM. L. REv. 735, 741 (1962); Daum &
Phillips, The Implicationsof Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939, 951-52 (1962). But compare
Comment, 71 YALE L.J. 736, 746 (1962). ("It may be argued that a broker in such a case has
acted merely as an agent, and that his inside information should not be considered since it
was not conveyed .... But non-public information possessed by a broker will in all likelihood play some role, albeit indiscernible, in any transaction to which he is an advisor. The
most satisfactory solution.., would be to place upon the broker a duty to disclose .... ").
Execution of unsolicited orders by a brokerage house has been held to disqualify a broker
from compensation under § 249 of the Bankruptcy Act. In re Midland United Co., 64 F.
Supp. 399, 417 (D. Del. 1946). But compare the ambiguous opinion in In re Mountain States
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supervision, as to fiduciary accounts. 161 No significant relaxation on the ban
on trading for discretionary accounts has taken place.162
The view has been expressed that the Cady, Roberts decision may result in a
large number of withdrawals by brokerage partners and trustees from corporate directorships.163 This assumption is based on the fear that innocent
transactions that coincide with important new corporate decisions may give
rise to a presumption that inside information had been improperly used. However, the recent case of Blau v. Lehman164 suggests that courts will be unwilling
Power Co., 35 F. Supp. 307, 311 (D. Del. 1940), aff'd, 118 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1941). The
Cady, Roberts opinion is also ambiguous on this point, observing that the "prohibition
extends not only over his own account but to selling for discretionary accounts and soliciting
and executing other orders." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, at p. 7. If
execution of unsolicited orders is exempt under the rule, merely making a market in a security would not, absent a consistent pattern of profitable changes in inventory, result in
liability. But the risk of liability is such as to make participation in making a market undesirable, and withdrawal of directors' firms as specialists or dealers would seem necessary as
long as broker-dealer functions remain unsegregated. Cf New York Stock Exchange, Educational Release 151 (1961) ("Usually the responsibilities of a director are clear-cut and recognized by a member organization. What may not be as evident is that more than ordinary
diligence is required when the director relationship is combined with options to acquire the
security while dominant participation in the market by the firm may enhance the value of
such options."). See also Kennedy, Problems of Securities Underwriters and Dealers (mimeo
1962) (address before the Section on Corporation, Business, and Banking Law of the American Bar Association), reprinted in 18 Bus. LAW. 71 (1962).
161Edward Hopkinson, Jr., 13 S.E.C. 404 (1943); Godfrey B. Simonds, 16 S.E.C. 116
(1944); International Hydro-Electric System, SEC Public Utility Holding Company Act
Releases Nos. 12,379, 12,412 (1954). But compare Thomas J. Walsh, 18 S.E.C. 218 (1945);
Lee S. Buckingham, 10 S.E.C. 1063 (1942).
162
But see William C. Langley, SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 8077 (1948)
(life insurance company allowed to trade where necessary to comply with Massachusetts law
providing that assets of insurance company must be at disposal of its board of directors);
Edward Hopkinson, Jr., 13 S.E.C. 404 (1943) (exception as to trading in preferred stock and
bonds of subsidiary of reorganized corporation where stock and bonds were selling at or
near par, and fluctuation was unlikely).
163
See Phelps, "Hazards of the Stock Market," Atlantic Monthly, April 1962, pp. 80-81.
This forecast has received confirmation. "The familiarity with a company's affairs which is
derived from the financial advisor or director relationship, in turn leads to investment in the
company's securities and recommendations to the customers of a firm ....The subjection
of the broker to vague and ill-defined risks because of the relationship will result in and has
already caused many competent persons to refuse to accept directorships." Daum & Phillips,
The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAw. 939, 959 (1962). See also Windels, Some
S.E.C. Problems and Techniques, 8 N.Y.L.J. 169, 183 (1962) ("[S]ome mutual funds will not
permit persons associated with them to serve as directors of the issuers of their portfolio
securities. Many an investment-banking house is now adopting this practice even though it
has underwritten a distribution of securities of the issuer."). See also Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 19, 1962, p. 1, col. 6.
164368 U.S. 403 (1962), 50 CALrF. L. REv. 500 (1962). Before deciding questions of law,
the Supreme Court affirmed, as "not clearly erroneous," the trial court's finding that the
defendant partnership's profits were made on its own initiative, independent of any advice
given it by a member-director. This conclusion was reached on a record that contained
testimony that "respondent Thomas had succeeded Hertz, another Lehman partner, on the
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to indulge in such automatic presumptions, absent added proof. It must also
be remembered that conclusive proof of causation was present in Cady,
Roberts. It may thus be possible for brokers to remain on corporate boards
while trading in the stock of such corporations. Caution, of course, is warranted where they do so. The Cady, Roberts decision is at the very least a
warning to directors to abandon the remnants of the notion that they serve as
representatives of special interests rather than as fiduciaries for shareholders as
a whole.
A more cautious, but probably unnecessary, course of action would demand
that brokers and trustees refrain from making investments incorporations in
which their associates serve as directors. It has been observed that this limitation would constitute a betrayal of trust responsibilities,165 even though only
a very severe definition of trust responsibilities would demand that a trustee
be free to make any lawful investment on behalf of his beneficiary. 66 In fact,
no trustee is ever thus free, since he is limited, at least to a small extent by
prohibitions against self-dealing. Forbidding a trust company or brokerage
house to make investments in the handful of corporations on whose boards it
may be represented will not ordinarily so narrow the possible range of investment choices as to constitute an abdication of a trustee's obligation to make
the best possible investment for his cestuis. The customary explanation advanced for the presence of brokerage partners on corporate boards derives
from the superior financial advice they may bring to the management of
fledgling corporations. Representation on a number of smaller corporate
boards is not inconsistent with the discharge of trust responsibilities, and corporations so large and well established as to be almost obligatory investments
for trust monies are ordinarily less dependent on the capital market and have
adequate financial management of their own. Express trustees, and directors
of mutual and pension funds and insurance companies are presented with
similar problems by the Cady, Roberts decision; but to the extent that the investments of such funds tend to be of a stable character, there is less risk that
trustees will run afoul of prohibitions against insider trading whatever course
they may adopt.
5. Implied Civil Liability.-In its decision in Cady, Roberts, the Commission for the first time took note of the fact that because of the implication of
board... that Hertz had 'joined Tidewater Company thinking it was going to be in the
interests of Lehman Brothers'; and that he had suggested Thomas as his successor partly
because it was in the interest of Lehman." 368 U.S. at 406. The trading partner had testified
that Thomas "spoke very highly of the management and prospects of the Tide Water Oil
Company." Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 795 (1960).
165 Phelps, supra note 163.

166 There is no such general principle in the law of trusts. "Any legal entity capable of
taking the title to the trust property may be a trustee of it." BOGERT, Tkusrs 112 (3d ed.
1952).
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civil liability for statutory violations, "the securities acts may be said to have

67
generated a wholly new and far-reaching body of federal corporation law."1
The chairman of the Commission has subsequently gone further: "Counsel
must be aware of the rights and duties created by this jurisprudence and must
appreciate its applicability to a two-man corporation as well as to A.T.&.T.
In all probability, this federal influence will expand rather than contract." 16s
The bases of this liability are three-fold. First, recourse may be had to the
common-law doctrine implying tort liability from violation of a criminal
statute. Second, the void contract provision of section 29(b) of the Exchange
Act may be held to create a civil right of action under common-law principles.
Third, support for implied liability may be drawn from certain jurisdictional
provisions contained in section 27 of the act. Examination of each of these
approaches is necessary if the vitality of the implied liability doctrine is to be

appraised.
Civil tort liability has been implied in a large number of cases arising under
both rule lOb-5169 and other provisions of the Securities Acts.170 The courts
have generally proved willing to view investors as members of a class protected by the criminal provisions of securities legislation. However, decisions
construing state laws imposing criminal liabilities upon corporate directors are
by no means as uniform,171 and the Second Circuit has twice suggested that it
172
might decline to imply civil liability for violation of the SEC proxy rules.
The application of the doctrine to insider-trading cases should not be taken
for granted, since the question has not yet been passed upon by the Supreme
167 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, p. 4. See also McClure v. Borne
Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir. 1961).
168 Cary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REV. 857, 858-59 (1962).
169 E.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960);
Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369
(3d Cir. 1956); Beury v. Beury, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955) (dictum); Fratt v. Robinson,
203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fishman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951);
3 Loss 1963.
170 The cases are collected in North, "Implied Civil Liability Cases Under the Federal
Securities Laws," Corporate Practice Commentator, May 1962, p. 1.
171 Compare Drees v. Minnesota Petroleum Co., 189 Minn. 608, 250 N.W. 563 (1933);
Shepard v. City Co. of N.Y., 24 F. Supp. 682 (D. Minn. 1938), appealdismissed, 106 F.2d
994 (8th Cir. 1939) (tort liability for failure to register stock implied), with Barth v. Klicpera,
248 Mich. 460, 227 N.W. 757 (1929) (tort liability for failure to register stock not implied).
Cf. Hayman v. Morris, 36 N.Y.S.2d 756, 766 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (no implied liability in derivative action under penal law forbidding corporation from purchasing own stock out of capital); Steckler v. Pennroad Corp., 136 F.2d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1943) (no implied liability in
derivative action under penal law forbidding holding corporation from owning more than
specified percentage of railroad stock). See also notes 230, 231 infra.
172 Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1956)
(dictum), 70 HARV. L. REv. 1493 (1957); Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 765-66, 774 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955) (dictum). But see Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,
288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
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Court with reference to any of the securities legislation.173 The conflicting approaches that may be taken to the problem are illustrated by the recent split
between the Second and Eighth Circuits in relation to implied civil liability
under the Investment Company Act. Whether civil liabilities under this legislation "are implied unless the legislature evidences a contrary intention"174 or
whether "the courts will imply a liability only to implement a manifest intent" 175 is a question which, contrary to recent hopes, the Supreme Court will
76
not reach in the immediate future.1
It seems clear that the Eighth Circuit's dictum goes too far, and that mani-

fest legislative intent has little to do with the implication of liability. In the
United States, unlike Great Britain and Canada,177 cases in this area tend to
turn not on manifest legislative intention but on the character of the interest
to be protected. This is the thrust of the Restatement rule, 7 8 and American
173 Certiorari has been denied in three cases involving an implication of civil liability
under rule 10b-5. Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 870 (1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
174 Brown v. Bifllock, 194 F. Supp. 207,224 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
Accord, Panama R.R. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209, 216 (1924) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Sitatutes
even when in terms covering only particular cases may imply a policy different from that of
the common law.... ."); Thayer, Public Wrong andPrivate Action, 27 HAav. L. REv. 317,
320 (1914).
175Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 369
U.S. 424 (1962). Accord, United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287,298-99 (1935) (Cardozo,
J., dissenting) ("The judgment of the court rests upon the ruling that another purpose, not
professed, may be read beneath the surface ....Thus the process of psychoanalysis has
spread to unaccustomed fields."); Lowndes, Civil Liability Createdby Criminal Legislation,
16 MINN. L. REv.361 (1932).
176 Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., supra note 175.
177 The early doctrine of Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402, 410, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196
(Q.B. 1854) held that "in every case where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit
of a person, he shall have a remedy... for recompense of a wrong done him contrary to
said law." But this view has been greatly qualified by English courts. See Atkinson v. Newcastle & Gateshead Waterworks Co., 2 Ex. D. 441, 448 (1877) (liability "depend[s] on the
purview of the legislature in the particular statute, and the language which they have there
employed ....); Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co., [1923] 2 K.B. 832,840-41 (liability "depends on the intention of the act"); Glanville Williams, The Effect ofPenalLegislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MOD. L. Rav. 233 (1960). See also Direct Lumber Co. v. Western
Plywood Co., 32 D.L.R.2d 227, aff'd, 39 W.W.R. 43 (1962) (declining to imply private right
of action under Alberta price discrimination law). In general, British law implies civil liability only where there is some statutory indication that liability is intended, or where penal
legislation defines a duty of care existing at common law. Industrial legislation, however, is
an exception to this rule. See also Monk v. Warbey, [1935] 1 K.B. 75. But liability is readily
implied under civil law. See Newman, Breach of Statute as the Basis of Responsibility in the
Civil Law, 27 CAN. BAR REV. 782 (1949). For an American approach strikingly at variance
with the British, see Morris, Role of CriminalStatutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L.
Rv.21, 48 (1949).
178
RsTAEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1938): "The violation of a legislative enactment by doing
a prohibited act or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an
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courts have proven generally willing to imply liability on this basis under both
statutes 179 and administrative regulations1S0
The courts have made a number of attempts to develop a semblance of consistent doctrine in the field. A rule that would decline to imply civil liability
for torts not recognized at common law has gained little favor.18 ' Sometimes
stress has been placed on the severity of the criminal penalty and the size of the
resulting civil liability.18 2 Distinctions between misfeasance and nonfeasance
have been drawn, 8 3 although these have not been satisfactory to those viewing
18 4
civil liability as a means of controlling conduct rather than assuring redress.
Finally, it has been suggested that absolute liability statutes should not supply
the basis for tort actions since the requisite fault is not present,18 5 even though
it is not explained why courts are more shocked by absence of fault than by
absence of criminal intent. The attempted distinction here seems to rest on
revulsion against the "Darkness at Noon" quality of the criminal statutes
themselves.
The Restatement rule, with its stress on injury to protected interests rather
interest of another if: (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an
interest of the other as an individual; and (b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment
where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a
is intended to protect; and (c)
particular hazard, the invasion of the interest results from that hazard; and (d)the violation
is a legal cause of the invasion."
179 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (provision of
Railway Labor Act barring racial discrimination by labor unions); Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (statute barring discrimination by air
carriers); and Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (wiretapping provisions

of Communications Act of 1934), are among the more notable cases. Numerous cases are

collected in 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5403 (1943). Failure to obtain a

license, however, is usually held not to supply a basis for civil liability, a rule that perhaps
may be relevant in connection with violation of the registration provisions of the 1933 act.
See Browne v. Shane, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926) (physician's license); 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRuCrTON 25 n.5 (1943). But compare Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261
Mass. 40,158 N.E. 270 (1927). See generally 2 Loss 941; Note,48 CoLIJM. L. REV. 456 (1948).
10

8 See

3 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra note 179, at 24 n.3.

181 Mairs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 73 App. Div. 265,76 N.Y. Supp. 838 (1902), aff'd, 175
N.Y. 409, 67 N.E. 901 (1903); Mack v. Wright, 180 Pa. 472, 36 Atl. 913 (1897); Evers v.
Davis, 86 N.J.L. 196, 90 At. 677 (1914); Williams, supra note 177, at 256-57 support the
distinction. Contra, RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1938); Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe
Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309 (1926); Note, 48 COLUM. L. REY. 456 (1948).
182 2 COOLEY, TORTS 1400 (3d ed. 1906); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 999 (1956); WINFIELD,
CASES ON TORT 174 (2d ed. 1943).
183 Thayer, supra note 174; Kirby v. Boyleston Market Ass'n, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 249
(1859); Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md. 312, 326 (1874); Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R.I. 456 (1877);
Note, 13 CALIF. L. REV.428 (1925).
184 Morris, supra note 177, at 468. See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1938).
185 Note, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 456, 462 (1948); Morris, supra note 177, at 458-59, 472-73
Cf.Taber v. Smith, 26 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Burliev. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182
193 Pac. 684 (1920).
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than fault, has been criticized by the supporters of the view that civil liability
primarily serves an in terrorem function.186 But this stress on defined duties
rather than absolute prohibitions seems central to the law of torts and is the
chief limitation placed on the implication of liability. 8 7 The private attorneys
general created by provisions like 16(b) have few precursors at common law.
In the ordinary lOb-5 case, the contemplated causation would seem clear
enough. Demands for a clearer showing of a connection between criminal invasion of a protected interest and civil injury may be made when derivative
actions under the rule are at issue or when efforts are made to imply civil lia-

bility under provisions like the SEC proxy rules.
The imposition of liability for nondisclosures under the rule should not
pose problems unless the courts revert to the earlier misfeasance-nonfeasance
distinction. The relevance of that distinction would seem limited to actions for
negligence, not actions where fraud, even if constructive, is at issue. Liability
for nondisclosure when the statutory duty is known differs from vicarious liability, which still retains its capacity to disturb the courts as the recent Brouk
case indicates. 88 The criminal penalties for Exchange Act violations are suf-

ficiently large to sustain implied liability on a tort theory 8 9 should the relative
severity of penalties be considered significant.
The provision of section 29(b) of the Exchange Act making void "every
contract made in violation of any provision" of the act has been held to give a
186 Morris, supra note 177, at 470-77: "If the criminal court may punish any act which
has a vicious tendency even though it happens to cause no loss, it may not be amiss for the
civil court to punish the same act even though the injury which coincidentally occurs is not
of the type which the legislature sought to prevent." Id. at 475. Cf. Grey's Ex'r v. Mobile
Trade Co., 55 Ala. 387 (1876). The orthodox rule is that of Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125
(1874).
187 Cf. Morris, The Relation of CriminalStatutes andTort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REV. 453,
476 (1932): "In this paper there is no attempt to indicate the basis of limitation of liability ... but regardless of what the limiting principle should be, the rule of Gorrisv. Scott is
ill-advised."
188 Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961). The court accepted the
contention that "there is a fundamental and critical distinction to be drawn between a case
where a director is an actor and joint tort feasor in violating a statute and a case where the
asserted liability is predicated upon vicarious liability for allegedly causing the corporation
he serves to violate the statute." The court, by way of dictum, suggested that vicarious
liability might be implied under the 1934 act which, unlike the Investment Companies Act,
makes controlling persons jointly and severally liable Id. at 917. Section 20(a) of the 1934 act
provides for a defense in cases where "the controlling person acted in good faith and did
not... induce the act.., constituting the violation." 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (1958). Whether it creates presumptive vicarious liability by making directors as
such controlling persons is unclear. 2 Loss 781-82. The Investment Company Act negatives
express vicarious liability by defining control to exclude "power... solely the result of an
official position with such company." 54 Stat. 791 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)(2)(a)(9) (1958).
See also Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 3 Loss 2027-28.
189 2 Loss 944. Section 32(a) of the act provides for fines up to $10,000 and imprisonment
up to two years, "but no person shall be subject to imprisonment... for the violation of any
rule if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule."
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cause of action for damages as well as for rescission. 190 Similar results have been
reached under other sections of the securities acts. 191 This result is not surprising since the liability established by 29(b) is as much expressed as implied.
State courts applying blue sky laws have allowed suits for rescission of illegal
contracts even where express voidability provisions were lacking.192 The conclusion that section 29(b) affords a private remedy is reinforced by the language of a 1938 amendment to the provision declaring that "no contract shall
be deemed to be void by reason of this subsection in any action maintained in
reliance upon this subsection," by purchasers from brokers violating section
15(c)(1), "unless such action is brought within one year."' 193 A suit under a
contract rationale differs from a tort suit in a number of respects. Since the

suit is on the contract, privity, or a third-party beneficiary relationship, is required.19 4 Section 29(b), therefore, cannot readily be applied to exchange
transactions. Limitations periods for tort and contract actions may differ'95
96
or surand differences may also exist with respect to measure of damages'
197
vivability and assignability of actions.
Section 27 of the Exchange Act confers on the federal courts exclusive juris-

diction "of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liabil-

ity or duty" created by the act or rules under it. It is similar in its language to
190 E.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (alternate
ground) (applying rule l0b-5). See also Coburn v. Warner, 110 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (rule 15 cl-4); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) § 17(a); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) applying § 15(c)(1).
191
Section 26(b) of the Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 835 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79(b),and
§ 47(b) of the Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 845 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-56(b) (1958) are
virtually identical. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944), is the leading case under the Holding Company provision; Schwartz v. Bowman, 156
F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) appeal dismissed sub nom. Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195
(2d Cir. 1959). See also Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), the leading
case under the Investment Company Act. An action for damages as well as for rescission has
been implied under the voidability provision of the California blue sky statute. Auslen v.
Thompson, 38 Cal. App. 2d 204, 101 P.2d 136 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
192 3 Loss 1667-81. See Pollak v. Staunton, 210 Cal. 656, 293 Pac. 26 (1930) (statute);
Vercillini v. V.S.I. Realty Co., 158 Minn. 72, 196 N.W. 672 (1924) (no statute); Kenalos v.
H. V. Greene Co., 81 N.H. 426, 128 At. 335 (1925). Most state statutes expressly give a right
of rescission. Some expressly exclude implied liability. See e.g., UNORM Sacuirris Acr
§ 410(h).
3
19
See 3 Loss 1760.

194 Cf. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207,229-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1961): "Privity of contract
between the plaintiffs and the defendants is not a fixed condition precedent to the implication of a private [tort] remedy for a statutory violation that injured the plaintiffs, members of
the protected class.... It is an evidentiary fact to be considered in conjunction with other
material facts in determining whether the relationship (such as it is) between the plaintiffand
the defendants and the nature of the particular acts.., involve the duty created by the
statute ....The relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the nature of the
defendants' participation in the challenged transactions, and the plaintiffs' reliance upon the
defendants' acts may vary."
1953 Loss 1773-76.
196Id. at 1793-95.
197 Id. at 1817-18.
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provisions of the Securities9 8 and Investment Company'9 9 Acts which confer
concurrent jurisdiction upon federal courts. The provisions of section 44 of the
Investment Company Act have been used as an argument for implied civil
liability. Since the SEC can only bring equity suits and there are separate provisions for criminal proceedings, it has been suggested that "the other elements
in section 44 must refer to appropriate private actions and suits... to enforce
any liability created by the act." 200 But this argument is specious since both
the Investment Company and Securities Exchange Acts contain express provisions for civil liability to which the jurisdictional clauses apply. 20 1 Support for
implied civil liability must therefore be found in common-law tort concepts
and in the language of section 29(b) and its 1938 amendments. The argument
for civil liability under section 29(b) seems to be incontrovertible. The use of
the maxim expressio unius est excluslo alterius as an argument against civil
liability has gained little favor with the Supreme Court20 2 in its earlier ventures into the complexities of securities legislation, and in any case cannot be
used to reject liabilities recognized by section 29(b) and its amendments.
The scope of the civil liabilities in relation to sales by insiders has been the
subject of elaborate discussion 2 03 and much controversy. The carefully delineated, express liabilities contained in sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act
have led a number of commentators to deny the existence of any implied civil
action in favor of buyers of stock under either rule lOb-5 or section 17(a) of
the Securities Act.2 04 One commentator has expressed the fear that "the continued denigration of the buyer's express remedies under the 1933 act in favor
198 48 Stat. 86-87 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(v)(a) (1958). No reference to suits
in equity is made in this provision.
199 54 Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)43 (1958).
200 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
201 E.g., Securities Exchange Act, §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18(a), 48 Stat. 890, 896, 897 (1934), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78(i)(e), 78p(b), as amended, 78r(a) (1958); Investment Company Act, § 30(f),
54 Stat. 837 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1958).
202 SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). See Fratt v. Robinson,
203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). Compare Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
203 See particularly Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close
Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 505 (1953); 3 Loss
1778-92.
204 3 Loss 1790-91; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949),
rev'd, 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Co., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.
Pa. 1948); Montague v. Electronic Corp., 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Cf. the attitude
of the SEC as expressed in 1952: "While it is true that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
rule X-10B-5 thereunder involves fraud in both the purchase and the sale, I believe that section 17 of the 1933 act adequately covers the field with respect to sales, with respect to any
person selling.... I am not saying it does not apply to sales, but in practical application it
directs itself to purchases in our application of the rule." Hearingsbefore a Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at
724 (1952) (testimony of Peter T. Byrne).
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of rule lOb-5 and even section 17(a) of the 1933 act itself, may persuade the
Supreme Court, which has yet to consider any implied remedy under the
SEC statutes-to throw its collective hands up and the Kardon doctrine
out."20S Other views would limit the application of implied liability to practices for which no express action in favor of buyers is available,20 6 or would
allow an implied action, with its generous limitations period and damage
rules, only where the proof available exceeds that needed under the express
provisions with their diluted scienter requirement. 207 But the courts have been
reluctant to so limit buyers' actions, and have allowed buyers to sue under
both 17(a) 208 and 10b-5209 even where an express remedy is provided by the
Securities Act. The express .actions included in the Exchange Act itself have
given the courts little difficulty, since they do not purport to establish a general
remedy for fraud.210
The most vexing problems presented by the implied liabilities relate to their
source rather than their scope. It seems clear that any liability under a void
contract theory arises directly from section 29(b), and hence that such contract actions are maintainable throughout the nation and may be brought in
the federal courts without regard to diversity of citizenship. 211 But liability
under a tort theory presents more difficult problems of federal jurisdictionproblems that have been extensively discussed elsewhere 212 and that must
be deemed beyond the scope of this comment.
A question also exists as to whether rule lOb-5 authorizes derivative suits
on behalf of a corporation brought by stockholders who were not themselves
defrauded. In the Slavin2=3 and Birnbaum214 cases the courts refused to enter205 3 Loss 1790.
206

Latty, supra note 203.
207 Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank,
J., dissenting).
208 E.g., Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
209 Ibid.; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d
670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962);
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960). Cf.
Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (applied to municipal bond transactions specifically exempt under express provisions). This view is currently supported by
the SEC. See Cary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REv. 857, 861-62 (1962).
210 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
211 Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Cf. Saminsky v.
Abbott, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,047 (Del. Ch. 1961) (recovery in state court for void
contract claims brought under § 47(b) of Investment Company Act).
212 2 Loss, 986-1013; Note, 48 CoLUM. L. REV. 1090 (1948). See Dann v. StudebakerPackard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp.
1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
213
Slavin v. Germantown FireIns. Co., 174 F.2d 799,807 (3d Cir. 1949) (where corporate
agent defrauded assignors of stock warrants, "the right of redress, if any, belongs to the as-
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tain such suits, concluding that the Exchange Act is not a means for holding
directors to fiduciary standards in their dealings with the corporation itself.
This is not to say that the corporation has no rights under the rule as to
dealings in its own stock. A controversial recent case 215 has allowed a derivative suit against persons who had defrauded a corporation when buying newly
issued stock from it. This case has been much criticized. But it seems essentially correct. A corporation is entitled to the same rights under the rule as any
other trader. 216 Any other result would in effect declare that misrepresentation
and fraudulent nondisclosure by a purchaser of stock are permissible so long
as the victim is the issuer itself. The corporation's appropriate rights under the

rule are thus essentially those of an investor since it has rights against those
who by deceit and nondisclosure defraud it, but not against those who manage
and manipulate it for their own ends.
Under the SEC proxy rules, similar results have been reached. Though at
first courts were inclined to question whether suits might be brought under the
rules by persons not themselves fraudulently induced to give proxies, 217 it was
concluded in the recent Dann218 case that the rules were designed for the protection of corporations as well as insurgent shareholders. A representative
219
suit by shareholders was thus allowed as a matter of "federal common law."
But this federally-created derivative right was held to encompass only such
prospective and declaratory relief as might prevent the perpetration of fraud
by outsiders upon the corporation. Once control and management had passed
to a new group, the proxy rules could not supply a means for redressing the
signors, and not to the corporation."). Cf. Norris Tool & Machine Co. v. Rosenlund, 355
Pa. 560, 50 A.2d 273 (1947) (denying the assignor a common-law right of action).
214 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) (sale of controlling interest not actionable at suit of shareholders not buying or selling since act is not a remedy for
fraudulent mismanagement). See 3 Loss 1468. Cf. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
215 Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), criticized
in 13 STAN. L. REv. 378 (1961). An earlier case also held that fraud as to the value of consideration paid for securities was actionable under rule 10b-5: Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d
447 (9th Cir. 1956).
216 A corporation defrauded in its dealings in another corporation's stock may of course
sue. See Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum); 13 STAN.
L. REV. 378 (1961).

217 Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
218
Dann v. Studebaker Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
219 The court attempted to distinguish the Howardcase, 238 F.2d 790, on the basis that
the suit there was derivative rather than representative and that the right involved in Dann
was not a corporate right but rather a shareholder's "right to the free exercise of the corporate franchise." 288 F.2d at 210. This distinction was made even though the plaintiff was not
himself fraudulently induced to give a proxy. But the court conceded that its rules "are merely
legal formalisms in which the court elects to clothe its choice of the underlying policy considerations upon which the real basis of decision must rest." 288 F.2d at 211.

1962]

INSIDER LIABILITY

grievances of stockholders against the management of the corporation. 220 The
claim for retrospective relief was held to constitute a separate cause of action,
not created or governed by "federal common law" and hence not maintainable
in the federal courts, at least without recourse to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, which the court refused to apply. The court in Dann also rejected without discussion the argument that activities of directors installed as a result of
improper proxy solicitations might be rescinded under section 29(b).221 However, a recent case under the Investment Company Act proxy rules allowed
rescission of such transactions, distinguishing Exchange Act cases on the persuasive basis that "the 1940 Act operates as a corporation law for investment
companies. In sharp contrast, the 1934 Act... regulates one phase-the purchase and sale of corporate securities." 2 22 But within this phase of activity, at
least, the case for civil liability under Exchange Act rules seems clear. The
rule of Cady, Roberts may ultimately be binding in private as well as public
law.
6. Cady, Roberts and Administrative Law.-Because of the probability of
civil liability, any extension of the scope of rule lOb-5 is of great importance
not only in administrative and criminal proceedings but also to the common
law of securities trading. Moreover, the continuing possibility that the SEC
may be empowered by decision or statute to enforce restitution to private
parties enhances the significance of interpretations of its rules. 223
The opinion in Cady, Roberts should prove a rather durable pronouncement. Its declarations as to facts that need be disclosed and as to privity do
not go substantially beyond the most advanced common-law view. In charging
220 Similar conclusions have been reached under the Holding Company Act. See Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
221 Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 637, 639 (1962).
222 Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 233 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without considerationof the
point,294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). But compareBrouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901,
908-11 (8th Cir. 1961).
223 See generally 3 Loss 1824-29. For expressions of SEC policy as to enforcement of
restitution under 17(a) and lOb-5, see HearingsBefore a Subcommittee of the House Interstate andForeign Commerce Committee, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 724-25 (1952) (testimony of

Peter T. Byrne); Cary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L. REv. 857, 861 (1962). The government has
been allowed to sue for restitution to private parties in cases under the Rent Control and
Fair Labor Standards Acts. See Mitchell v. Robert De Marco Jewelry Inc., 361 U.S. 288
(1960) and cases there cited. But cf. United States v. Hutchinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.
1956) (no enforcement of restitution under Food and Drug Act); Cherner v. Transitron
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962) (dictum). Informal enforcement of restitution by
threat of criminal prosecution is common. 3 Loss 1824 n.469.
It is not altogether clear whether a private party may vindicate the rights of other defrauded traders in a class action under the rule. See 3 Loss 1819-24. One district court refused to use its discretion to canvass possible participants in such an action. See Cherner v.
Transitron Corp., supra. Cf. Allen v. Hyatt. 30 T.L.R. 444 (1914). See also SEC v. Bennett
& Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. 91,172 (D.N.J. 1962) (refusal to appoint equity receiver of
solvent corporation for benefit of potential private suitors). Compare Oppenheimer v. F. J.
Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944) (A. N. Hand, J.); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F.

Supp. 753, 762-63 (D.N.J. 1955), and cases there cited.
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a person receiving information from an insider, the decision has gone beyond
the common law, though not without support in some cases under it. But the
SEC is not limited to common-law doctrines in construing its fraud rules.224
Its construction of the rules of course is reviewable by the courts. Since section
10(b) of the Exchange Act is not self-executing, 225 the Commission cannot

argue that its decision is valid as an order implementing the statute if not valid
as an application of rule l0b-5.226 Thus the fact that the Cady, Roberts decision operates prospectively only makes little difference as to the validity of its
principle in later cases. 22 7 Since it cannot be sustained as an order, the courts
must ultimately decide whether it falls within rule lOb-5.
The principle announced, however, is one that may invite substitution of
judgment on judicial review. The generality of the Cady, Roberts rule228 and
the relatively equal qualifications of the courts and Commission in relation to
general questions of fiduciary duty22 9 suggest that the courts may be inclined
to make their own policy judgments on appeal. On the other hand, the Commission has been viewed as having been delegated unusually broad powers to
prevent fraud, and a different result will probably obtain. 23 0 The courts are
224 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Securities, Inc., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,365 U.S. 814 (1961) (rule lOb-5); Norris &
Hirschberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139
F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1943); Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d
652, 658 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 703 (1937) (§ 17(a)); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808, 829, 831 (D. Del. 1951). See also UNFoRM SEcuRrrms Acr § 401(d)
(" 'Fraud,' 'deceit,' and 'defraud' are not limited to common law deceit"). But compare SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961) (2-1 panel opinion, one
judge concurring only in the result).
225 The rule prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the commission may prescribe."
226 Compare SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

227 Where orders operate retroactively, "such retroactivity must be balanced against the
mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design." Id. at 203.
228 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATV E LAW § 30.11 (1958).
229 But see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947), criticized in 4 DAvis, op.
cit. supranote 228, at 246: "Although other aspects of the case could justify the narrowscope
of review, the idea of comparative qualifications alone surely does not. The problem of the
limits of the fiduciary principle is a broad and fundamental one with which the Supreme
Court is fully competent to deal." Compare SEC v. Cogan, 201 F.2d 78, 86 (9th Cir. 1952):
"For many generations the courts of equity have been dealing with these problems of
fiduciary duty .... The... judge... was as well qualified to pass upon.., standards of
.. conduct. .. as was the Commission."
230 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., supranote 229 (policy decision held not delegated to Commission). Cf. 4 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 228, at 249: "Just as the broader review of interpretative rules depends upon lack of delegation of power to the agency, and just as the
narrower review of legislative rules depends upon a delegation of power to the agency, so the
scope of review of administrative adjudication often depends upon delegation or the lack of
it." For a suggestion that the SEC fraud rules are essentially interpretative, see Blair-Smith,
Forms of Administrative Interpretation Under the SecuritiesLaws, 26 IowA L. REv. 241, 267
(1940). But agencies are usually accorded broad discretion in formulating remedies for law
violations, since "Congress could not catalogue all the devices and strategems for circum-
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also reluctant to upset an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, 231
even though such interpretations do not gain added force from the agency's
unexercised power to amend its rules. 232 Thus the Commission should not be

held to have exceeded its authority under the rule, even if the decision is read
broadly.
The opinion, however, raises questions of administrative method, not
merely the jurisdictional questions that we have considered. The objection
that "absent from the Commission's decision is any statement as to what constitutes fraud as used in Rule lOb-5"233 will probably not impress the courts,
which have themselves been notably reluctant to define fraud. 234
It would also seem clear that an agency can, by opinion as well as by rule,
make extensions in prior law beyond those necessary to decide the case before
it.235 The courts, however, may be unwilling, on review, to place their imprimatur on administrative opinions which, in addition to deciding the case
venting the policies of the act." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
Considerations of this sort may justify a flexible fraud rule. Compare note 80 supra.See also
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112 (1946): "'The relation of remedy to
policy is pecularly a matter for administrative competence'.. . . [O]nly if the remedy chosen
is unwarranted in law or is without justification in fact should a court attempt to intervene
in the matter."
231 Retroactivity can alter this reluctance. See 4 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 228, at 261.
232 4 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 228, at 462. No effort to amend was made in Cady,
Roberts. Cf. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952). It is sometimes intimated that the availability of the rule making power should cut down agency discretion in
adjudication. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947); SEC v. Capital Gains, Inc.,
300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961). This argument can be made on the basis that the rule-making
process involves detailed hearings, avoids retroactivity and is not circumscribed by separation of functions within the agency. Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which
Should it Be?, 22 LAW & CoNnrp.

PROB. 658, 664 (1957). But the last two arguments at

least are not relevant to Cady, Roberts. Participation by the Commission's staff in the
preparation of the opinion was one of the conditions of the offer of settlement. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, at 2 n.3.
2
33 Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAw. 939, 947 (1962).
23 4

See note 80 supra. Cf. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENcE 407 n.1 (1962): "Peculiarly dif-

ficult to reach by regulation are those cases where executives, directors, etc., exercise discretion in their own interests, in opposition to the interests of the group they supposedly represent. This is the problem of government, and we seem to be quite as far from solving it in the
business and social fields as we are in the more purely political." See also Kaplan, Conflict of
Interests: CorporateDirectors,50 ILL. BAR J. 1072, 1088 (1962): "Though it may not satisfy
one's sense of simplicity and symmetry to refrain from laying down broad prophylactic rules,
it is the writer's belief that the proper objectives of such rules, namely-the prevention of the
abuse of position for personal benefit--can best be achieved by a flexible standard in which
the propriety of an insider's conduct and its fairness in the light of specific and particular corporate interests is the ultimate criterion.... This calls for the application of ethical standards ...to particular sets of fact."

235 2 DAVIs, op. cit. supranote 228, at § 17.08. The suggestion of the panel opinion in the
Capital Gains case, 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1962), that any significant expansion of the law
must be made by rule, even where the administrative holding does not go beyond that
necessary to decide the case at hand seems clearly untenable where a statute or rule is selfexecuting.
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at hand, contain broad and unsupported dicta.2 36 If judicial assent to administrative generalizations is sought, the courts may insist either that the generalization be made by rule or that it be supported by adequate reasons and findings. Since courts lack the power, on review, to substitute their own findings
or reasons for those of an agency with primary jurisdiction, 237 opinions such
as that in Cady, Roberts may frequently be remanded. Where agencies desire
to expand prior law, they should either let a narrow holding in a single case
serve as signal, or should clarify both the scope of an expansion and the basis
upon which it rests. That discipline, more severe than that imposed on courts
themselves, may be the price exacted for the grant to agencies of discretionary
power within limited jurisdictions.
7. Conclusion.-The Cady, Roberts decision, in holding a trader liable for
nondisclosure in the absence of "special facts" or misrepresentations, announces a rule that does not go far beyond prior law, though subsection 3
rather than subsection 2 of the rule would seem the logical vehicle for its expansion. The application of the rule to persons in a bilateral relationship with
insiders likewise finds more support in prior law than may commonly be supposed. Literal use of the rule to charge "any person" receiving information
from an insider would possess advantages in establishing standards of fair
dealing meaningful to traders in the market acting in a wide variety of situations. The use of such a rule probably should be qualified where information
was innocently acquired or where there was no clear showing that it influenced
trading decisions. Cases involving the acquisition and use of trade secrets,
though not directly analogous, offer useful guidance in this sphere.
Application of the rule to exchange transactions and transactions involving
nonshareholders finds an adequate basis in fiduciary principles. The possibility of civil liability in some such transactions should not be excluded, since at
common law liability for fraud is not bounded by a strict privity rule. Privity,
rather than proof of damage, should continue to serve as the limiting principle
in suits where nondisclosure, rather than misrepresentation, supplies the
basis of liability.
While accepted tort principles demand the imposition of civil liability under
the rule, requirements of injury to a protected interest should prevent the use
of the rule as a remedy for corporate mismanagement as opposed to trading
frauds. The Cady, Roberts holding does not exceed the SEC's jurisdiction
under the rule, since the Commission is not limited by common-law fraud
standards. The scope and basis of the decision should be clarified, however, if
the courts are to make its rule fully effective as an alteration of the administrative and common law of securities trading.
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